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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the bank leverage adjustments after deposit
insurance adoption. Banks are found to increase signiﬁcantly their leverage after the
introduction of deposit insurance. However, the banks’ responses appear to be het-
erogenous. The magnitude of the change in bank leverage decreases with (i) the size,
(ii) the systemicity and (iii) the initial capitalisation of banks so that the most sys-
temic and the most highly leveraged banks are unresponsive to deposit insurance. As
a result, implementing a deposit insurance scheme could have important competitive
eﬀects.
Keywords: Deposit Insurance, Bank Risk-Taking, Leverage, Systemic Bank, Capi-
tal Buﬀer, Market Discipline, Too Big to Fail
JEL Classiﬁcations: G18; G21; G28; G32
∗I would like to give thanks to Romain Rancière and Jean Imbs who helped me along the way. I am
also grateful to Abel Brodeur, Thomas Breda, Claire Célerier, Clément de Chaisemartin, Riccardo De Bo-
nis, Hans Degryse, Thibaut Duprey, Henri Fraisse, Johan Hombert, Jean-Charles Rochet, Marc Sangnier,
Gabriel Zucman, Yanos Zylberberg, participants at the 17th Spring Meeting of Young Economics, partici-
pants at the 29th GdRE Annual International Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance, participants
at the 2nd MoFir Workshop, participants at the annual Royal Economic Society conference, participants
at the ACPR conference and seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics and at the University
of Zurich for valuable comments and discussions. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from "Région
Île-de-France" for this research. Any remaining errors are mine.
†Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution and Paris School of Economics.
61, rue Taitbout - 66-2771 - 75436 Paris Cedex 09; mathias.le@acpr.banque-france.fr
1
1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
Understanding the determinants of excessive bank risk-taking is a crucial issue, all the
more since the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis. This research agenda has received a lot of
attention and many suspects have been identiﬁed. Among them, excessive leverage is now
rightly considered as one of the key fragility that has triggered the Great Recession (Adrian
and Shin (2010), Brunnermeier (2009) and Acharya et al. (2009)). Highly leveraged ﬁ-
nancial institutions increase signiﬁcantly the risk of contagion as well as they have the
potential to disrupt durably the functioning of some ﬁnancial markets when facing large
unexpected shocks. In case of rapid and simultaneous deleveraging process, the credit sup-
ply is likely to shrink drastically, with adverse consequences on the real economy (Ivashina
and Scharfstein (2010)). In a sense, excessive leverage can be seen as an unintended conse-
quence of incomplete or ineﬃcient regulations which failed to provide correct incentives to
banks. In this respect, an intense debate concerning the adverse impact of state guarantees
and the Too Big to Fail issue has been revived by the massive bailouts and almost full
guarantees provided to the ﬁnancial industry after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
(Gropp et al. (2011), Oliveira et al. (2014)). Interestingly, similar concerns arose when
a large number of countries started to implement an explicit deposit insurance scheme:
these insurance schemes suﬀer from the same moral hazard issue as state guarantees by
giving banks strong incentives to adopt risky behaviors. Against this background, the
present paper examines the relations between deposit insurance and excessive leverage:
does deposit insurance adoption makes banks more prone to increase their leverage ratio
and, if so, is this unintended consequence uniformly distributed across banks ?
Introducing a deposit insurance scheme aims to protect small and presumably unin-
formed depositors against bank failures.1 Accordingly, deposit insurance should rule out
bank runs and ineﬃcient liquidation of proﬁtable projects (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)).
However, deposit insurance adoption is likely to mitigate, if not eliminate, market disci-
pline by depositors as shown by Martínez-Peria and Schmukler (2002), Demirguc-Kunt
and Huizinga (2004) and Karas et al. (2013). In absence of actuarially fair premia, de-
posit insurance poses a crucial moral hazard issue: it provides to banks strong incentives
1A brief presentation of the deposit insurance schemes as well as the associated costs and benefits can
be found in appendix A.
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to increase their risk-taking to exploit the put option value of deposit insurance (Merton
(1977), Marcus and Shaked (1984), Keeley (1990) and Pennacchi (2006)). In particular,
deposit insurance schemes with ﬂat-premia should result in reducing signiﬁcantly bank
capital buﬀer (Bond and Crocker (1993)). Ultimately, if the deposit insurance fund is
unable to eﬃciently manage this build-up of excessive risk-taking, the eﬀect of deposit
insurance might be to make depositors more exposed to bank failure.
This paper empirically investigates the eﬀects of deposit insurance adoption on bank
risk-taking, paying particular attention to the leverage of banks. More importantly, it
explores extensively the likely heterogeneity among banks’ responses, and by doing so, it
incidentally oﬀers an analysis of the Too Big to Fail issue. For this purpose, I use a newly
updated database on deposit insurance schemes around the world together with panel data
set covering banks in 123 countries over the period 1986-2011. Deposit insurance adoption
is found to increase bank risk-taking by signiﬁcantly reducing bank capital buﬀer: the
Capital-to-Assets ratio of banks decreases by around 15% after the implementation of
deposit insurance scheme. However, this adjustment is not uniformly distributed across
banks. I ﬁnd strong evidence that the positive shift in bank leverage decreases with the
(i) systemic importance and (ii) the relative size of banks. Consistently with the Too Big
to Fail hypothesis, the largest and the most systemic banks appear to be unresponsive to
deposit insurance adoption.
Previous research has investigated the adverse impact of deposit insurance adoption on
bank risk-taking (Kane (1989), Wheelock (1992), Wheelock and Wilson (1995), Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002), and Laeven (2002)). All these studies conclude that explicit
deposit insurance can be related to an increase in the probability of bank distress or a
decrease in aggregate banking stability. Recently, DeLong and Saunders (2011) conﬁrm
these results by studying the deposit insurance adoption that occurred in the USA in 1933.
Using internal loan ratings in Bolivia, Ioannidou and Penas (2010) show that banks are
more likely to originate riskier loans after deposit insurance implementation. All these
papers usually focus on a speciﬁc country (mainly the USA) or a limited set of countries2
and, when covering a large number of countries, they generally work at an aggregate
2DeLong and Saunders (2011), Ioannidou and Penas (2010) or Martínez-Peria and Schmukler (2002)
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level.3 In this regard, the present paper does not consider aggregate indicators of ﬁnancial
stability but bank-level measurements of risk-taking: it is among the ﬁrst to work at the
bank-level with a large cross-country data set. It is important because aggregate data may
mask valuable micro level patterns as the rest of the analysis will show. Above all, most
of the previous work focus on the impact of deposit insurance on asset risk or volatility
risk. In contrast the present paper investigates the consequences of deposit insurance on
bank leverage. This paper hence contributes to the literature by quantifying the impact
of deposit insurance adoption on individual bank risk of insolvency and by underlining the
prominent role of leverage in this process.
The adverse eﬀects of deposit insurance are not expected to be uniform across banks.
As underlined by Calomiris and White (1994), Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) and
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008), deposit insurance adoption should mainly beneﬁt to small
banks. Similarly, systemic banks that beneﬁt from implicit state guarantees (the Too Big
to Fail hypothesis) should not react to deposit insurance adoption because they escape
market discipline even before adoption. Finally, in absence of actuarially fair-premia, well-
capitalised banks implicitly subsidise highly leveraged banks (Marcus and Shaked (1984)).
These well-capitalised banks have also much more room for substituting deposits to equity.
It is thus expected that well-capitalised banks react more intensively than highly leveraged
banks to deposit insurance adoption.
In this respect, the most signiﬁcant contribution of this paper is to bring evidence
that banks’ responses to deposit insurance adoption are heterogeneous. Firstly, I ﬁnd
that the responsiveness of banks to the introduction of deposit insurance is positively and
signiﬁcantly related to the relative size and the systemicity of banks. For the most sys-
temic banks – i.e. those belonging to the top 10%/top 5% of the distribution within a
country – deposit insurance adoption has no signiﬁcant impact on leverage. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the view that systemically important banks already beneﬁt from im-
plicit state guarantees (as suggested by the Too Big to Fail hypothesis) so that they are
unaﬀected by the introduction of an explicit system of deposit insurance. Accordingly,
deposit insurance adoption could have important competitive effects by removing part of
3Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002),Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) or Beck (2008) for in-
stance
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the comparative advantage of large and systemic banks and by improving competition on
the banking market. Second, I provide evidence that banks’ response to deposit insurance
adoption is an increasing function of their initial leverage so that only the least leveraged
banks react to implementation of explicit deposit guarantees. The results indicates that
the 10% most highly leveraged banks before adoption do not change their capital buﬀer
after implementation of deposit insurance. We thus observe a kind of convergence process
across banks in terms of capital buﬀer: the whole banking system is less well-capitalised
and thus less resilient to large and widespread unexpected shocks.
From a methodological point of view, this paper examines the eﬀect of deposit insurance
adoption by using essentially a differences-in-differences methodology. Identiﬁcation relies
on comparisons of the changes in risk-taking over time between banks in countries that
adopted a deposit insurance scheme at a given date and banks in countries that did not.
There are potential estimation concerns that are carefully addressed. First, a correct
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect relies on the common trends assumption. If the trends of the
treatment and control groups diﬀer in a systematic way, the estimated treatment eﬀect is
unidentiﬁed. I address this issue by adding linear and quadratic country-speciﬁc trends and
by replicating the results on a sample using a diﬀerent control group. Second, the decision
to adopt a deposit insurance is likely to be endogenous: an increase in bank risk-taking
can signiﬁcantly raises the demand for insurance by depositors and puts governments
under pressure to adopt a deposit insurance scheme. I carefully consider this reverse
causality issue by running falsiﬁcation tests. Third and most importantly, I investigate the
possibility that deposit insurance adoption comes with simultaneous changes in ﬁnancial
regulation or with some country-speciﬁc aggregate shocks like banking crises. I check
that the results are not aﬀected by taking into account banking crisis episodes and by
controlling explicitly for changes in banking regulation. In particular, I show that the
heterogeneity in banks’ responses to deposit insurance adoption identiﬁed in this paper
cannot be confounded with alternative sources of heterogeneity in banks’ behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The second section presents the
data. I provide a short graphical and statistical analysis in the third section. In the fourth
section, I explain in details the identiﬁcation strategy. I present the results in the next
section. The sixth section consists in robustness checks and the last one concludes.
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2 Data
Sources and Construction This paper uses two distinct databases. The ﬁrst one is
the Fitch IBCA’s BankScope database, widely recognised as the most important banking
database in the world. Second, I construct a new data set by reviewing and updating
existing databases about deposit insurance schemes. Especially, I collect rigorously the
year of adoption of the deposit insurance scheme for each country. The data, the sources
and the exact procedures implemented are described extensively in the appendix B.
The restrictions imposed on the data set are also detailed in the appendix B. In par-
ticular, I choose to keep the largest set of countries as possible by including those having
already adopted a deposit insurance scheme before banking data started to be collected
(like USA or Germany for instance). The estimates of the eﬀect of deposit insurance adop-
tion should not be aﬀected directly by observations from these countries. However, these
observations enlarge the control group used in the estimation process helping to smooth its
size and its composition over time. To strengthen the validity of the results, I also perform
the regressions on a sample restricted to countries adopting a deposit insurance during the
period under study.4 I will come back to this issue when discussing the estimation strategy.
Ultimately, the main sample consists in a database with bank-level balance sheet in-
formation over the years 1986-2011 for 123 countries. Among these 123 countries, 88 have
an explicit deposit insurance scheme. For 57 of them, a deposit insurance scheme is imple-
mented during a period for which we have bank balance sheet information. The database
contains 222 099 bank-year observations and 20 703 unique banks.5 On average a bank
has 12 years of observations, with a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of 16 years. For
each country, the exact year of adoption and the number of banks are presented in table
1.
I face two important issues with this sample. The main diﬃculty arises from the in-
creasing coverage over time: the number of banks within a country and the number of
countries reported in BankScope increases sensibly over time, especially during the ﬁrst
41986-2011
5First, note that 9 957 (almost 48% of the sample) are US banks (112 398 obs.) and 2 237 (almost 11%
of the sample) are German banks (27 744 obs.). Second, among these 222 099 bank-year observation, 1 456
have missing log-transformed risk proxy because of negative value. I keep them because I run robustness
check using risk-proxy without log-transformation.
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years i.e. between 1986 and 1999. It is an important weakness that can aﬀect the results
and it is an important motivation for using bank ﬁxed-eﬀects. Second, there are some
heterogeneity in the deposit insurance characteristics across countries (upper bound, coin-
surance mechanism, nature of the premia...). Unfortunately, I cannot control explicitly for
these time-varying features by lack of information as explained in the appendices A and B.
I can only control for the time-invariant or slow-moving dimension of these characteristics
with bank ﬁxed-eﬀects. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to evaluate the
risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance which is independent of the characteristics of the
deposit insurance schemes. I argue that adoption itself is likely to have the largest eﬀect on
bank risk-taking while the various features may only impact marginally this initial adverse
eﬀect.
Bank Risk Measurements This paper aims to provide a new look on the eﬀects of a
speciﬁc regulatory change –the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme– on bank risk-
taking, with a particular focus on the leverage. Before presenting the indicators used, I
discuss brieﬂy data limitations. First, the database used consists in balance-sheet of banks,
and only few of these banks are listed.6 Hence, market-based measurements are not used
in this paper and only balance sheet measurements of risk are taken into consideration.
Second, Tier 1 and Total risk-weighted capital ratios are very often missing for many
banks from countries other than USA.7 The leverage ratio used in this paper is thus the
Capital-to-Assets ratio, i.e. the ratio of equity over total unweighted assets. But there are
also more fundamental reasons to focus on the Capital-to-Assets ratio.
While a preference toward a regulation based on risk-weighted leverage measures has
been observed these last twenty years, the recent ﬁnancial crisis has also stressed the im-
portance to monitor raw leverage ratios. For instance, Basel III agreements will introduce
“a simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio that is calibrated to act as a credi-
ble supplementary measure to the risk based capital requirements”.8 This ratio will help
to “constrain the build-up of leverage in the banking sector, helping avoid destabilising
deleveraging processes which can damage the broader financial system and the economy”
6Only 904 banks corresponding to 10 823 obs. are listed.
7Tier 1 ratio is missing for 77 292 observations over 94 774 (81%)
8http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf
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by introducing “additional safeguards against model risk and measurement error”. The
recent crisis has shed light on the limits of the regulation based on risk-weights (Acharya
et al. (2011)) and regulators now recognise the importance to also monitor raw leverage
ratio of banks.
I also investigate the eﬀect of deposit insurance on individual probability of default
by using the (log of) z-score. This increasingly popular measure of bank risk-taking9 is
computed as follow:
Zt =
µ(ROAAt) + CARt
σ(ROAAt)
The z-score combines the leverage risk with two additional dimensions of risk: the
proﬁtability and the volatility of returns. Formally, the z-score measures the individual
probability of insolvency (Boyd and Runkle (1993)).10 It reﬂects the distance-to-default
i.e. the number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROAA has to fall for the bank to
become insolvent for a given leverage ratio: the higher the z-score, the lower the risk of
default. Additional information about the z-score can be found in appendix.11
3 Graphical and Statistical Analysis
Before discussing the identiﬁcation strategy and the econometric results, I present some
graphical evidence that deposit insurance adoption can be suspected to increase both
leverage and probability of default. I start by presenting the evolution of both indicators
across time. It is important to ﬁgure out what is the global trend of these outcome
variables because identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption relies on time-
series comparisons.
In ﬁgures 1 and 2 , I plot the evolution of the average and the median values of both
9Beck (2008),Laeven and Levine (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Beck et al. (2011) for
instance
10Defining insolvency as the state in which capital is fully depletes by negative returns on asset, i.e.
CARt + ROAAt < 0, the probability of insolvency is defined as P [ROAAt < −CARt]. Then a simple
application of the Bienaymé-Chebyshev inequality provides an upper bound of this probability (with strict
equality if ROAAt is normally distributed):
P [ROAAt < −CARt] ≤ Z
−2
t
11To make both risk measurements homogeneous, I multiply the log of z-score by -1 such that lower
values of log of z-score are now associated with higher insolvency risk.
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risk measurements. The sample is restricted to banks facing deposit insurance adoption
to be more in line with the econometric analysis: it excludes banks that are not used to
identify the eﬀect of adoption. We observe that both the Capital-to-Assets ratio and the
log of z-score tend to increase over time (or at least to be ﬂat). For instance, the average
(median) value of the Capital-to-Assets ratio raises from 11% (7%) in 1990 to 15% (11%)
in 2002 before stabilizing around 13% (11%). The only notable exception concerns the
average Capital-to-Assets ratio during the years 2002-2005 and 2009-2011 during which it
is slightly decreasing. From these ﬁgures, we conclude that the eﬀect of deposit insurance
adoption that we capture in this paper –a downward shift of both the capital buﬀer and the
distance-to-default– is at odds with the trend observed these last 20 years in the sample.12
By comparing the distribution of both the log of z-score and the Capital-to-Assets
ratio before and after deposit insurance adoption, we can now ﬁgure out more precisely
the possible eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption. We want to know whether we observe
a systematic shift in the distribution after deposit insurance implementation that could
indicate an increase in bank risk-taking. Note that we continue to restrict the sample to
banks having observations before and after the introduction of deposit insurance adoption.
The ﬁgures 3 and 4 represent these two distributions and in both cases, we observe clearly
a left shift in the distribution of risk after the implementation of deposit insurance. This
indicates a decrease in both the Capital-to-Assets ratio and the distance-to-default, that
is to say an increase in bank risk-taking. For instance in ﬁgure 3, we have much less
very highly capitalised banks (i.e. those with a Capital-to-Assets ratio above 20%) and
much more highly under-capitalised banks (i.e. those between 10% and 20%) after deposit
insurance adoption. Figures 5 and 6 in appendix show the kernel density estimates of
these distributions. Kernel density estimates have the advantages of being smooth and of
being independent of the choice of origin. The previous conclusions are entirely conﬁrmed
by these ﬁgures.
However, when there are much more observations per banks after adoption than before,
these distributions are biased. To overcome this issue, I compute the average value before
and after adoption for both risk-taking indicators. Then, I keep only one observation per
12Recall that BankScope suffers from an artificial trend in coverage, especially in the years before 2000
that could explain the rapid increase observed between 1985 and 1991.
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bank and per period – i.e. one observation before and one observation after adoption –
and I plot the distributions of these average values in the ﬁgures 7 and 8 in appendix.
The previous conclusions are strengthened by this additional restriction. We continue
to observe a shift toward the left of the distribution after deposit insurance adoption
denoting an increase in risk-taking. In the ﬁgures 9 and 10 in appendix, I present the
distribution of the diﬀerence in the average values of risk before and after adoption for
each banks. Distributions with a large mass of negative values would be evidence in favor
of the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption. It would indicate that a large
fraction of banks have lower average Capital-to-Assets ratio or lower average distance-to-
default after adoption. This is exactly what is found: both distributions are highly skewed
toward negative values.
Finally, I report descriptive statistics for the leverage and the distance-to-default before
and after deposit insurance adoption in table 3. For both measurements, we have additional
evidence that deposit insurance is likely to have a negative eﬀect on risk-taking. The
average (resp. median) Capital-to-Assets ratio decreases by 10.2% (5.3%) and the average
(resp. median) log of z-score decreases by 4.9% (4.2%). Thresholds corresponding to the
25th and 75th percentiles also indicates an increase in risk-taking.
In conclusion, this graphical and statistical analysis oﬀers preliminary evidence that
deposit insurance adoption is likely to induce an increase in both the leverage ratio and
the probability of default. To conﬁrm this intuition, I conduct an econometric analysis.
The identiﬁcation strategy and the results are presented in the next section.
4 Identification Strategy
The primary goal of this paper is to assess over a large panel of banks the impact of deposit
guarantees on bank leverage. The identiﬁcation uses essentially a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
methodology. Deﬁne tˆj as the year in which a deposit insurance has been implemented in
country j and:
DIj, t =


1 if t ≧ tˆj
0 if t < tˆj
as a dummy taking the value of one after a deposit insurance was introduced in a given
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country and zero before. This is the main independent variable of interest. The baseline
regression performed is then:
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t (4.1)
where i denotes the bank, t the year and j the country. Riski,j,t stands for the diﬀerent
risk-taking proxies considered. Xi,t,j is the vector of control variables, θt are year ﬁxed-
eﬀects and ui are bank ﬁxed-eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.
The main coeﬃcient of interest is β, the eﬀect of introducing a deposit insurance scheme.
The identiﬁcation of β relies on the comparison of the changes in risk-taking over time
between banks in countries that adopted a deposit insurance scheme at a given date and
banks in countries that did not. The staggered passage of the deposit insurance means
that the control group is not restricted to countries that never adopt a deposit insurance
scheme. In fact, the identiﬁcation implicitly takes as the control group all banks operating
in countries that do not adopt a deposit insurance scheme at time t, even if they have
already adopted a deposit insurance or will adopt one later on.
Compared with previous work, this paper focuses on the within-bank eﬀect of deposit
insurance adoption by using bank ﬁxed-eﬀects ui. It is a way to control for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level.13 Recent work have also stressed that ﬁxed-
eﬀects explain most of the variation in leverage, for both ﬁrms and banks (Lemmon et al.
(2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010)). But, an important beneﬁt from using bank ﬁxed-
eﬀects is more directly related to the issue investigated. Deposit insurance adoption can
have two distinct eﬀects on bank risk-taking and it is important to consider them sepa-
rately. First, it can increase risk-taking for existing banks: this is the intensive margin
eﬀect. Second, it can promote the entry of riskier banks: this is the extensive margin
eﬀect. Using bank ﬁxed-eﬀects permits to focus on the intensive margin eﬀect. Naturally,
distinguishing these two eﬀects is important. But this approach is even essential given the
increasing coverage of BankScope. From 1985 to 2000, the number of banks reported in a
given country and the number of countries covered tends to increase continuously in the
13Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) detail various bank-level or country-level time-invariant differences that are
accounted for by using fixed-effects. Among them are accounting practices, balance sheet representation
and domestic regulatory adjustment. As explained previously, in the present situation it also controls for
any time-invariant differences in the feature of the deposit insurance schemes.
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sample. It is thus very diﬃcult to assess the extensive margin eﬀect because the results
could be largely driven by these artiﬁcial changes in coverage. To my knowledge, this
paper is one of the ﬁrst to consider seriously this issue.14
Other time-varying factors could also aﬀect the choice of banks leverage and if these
factors vary precisely at the time of deposit insurance adoption, it could produce spurious
correlations. To overcome this issue, it is possible to include time-varying control variables.
However, any covariates included as control variable must be unaﬀected by the treatment
(Roberts and Whited (2011)). This condition severely limits the possible covariates to
include. For instance, size is generally considered as an important determinant of leverage
structure but it is also very likely to be aﬀected by deposit insurance adoption. Hence,
I only consider a restricted set of control variables and I report all the results both with
and without these covariates.15
The ﬁrst control is the real GDP annual growth rate as the business cycles are one of
the major source of ﬂuctuation in the riskiness of bank’s balance sheet. Then the inflation
rate is included in the set of controls as a traditional determinant of bank risk-taking. In
order to control for the degree of ﬁnancial development, the logarithm of GDP per capita
is included in the vector of controls. They are all obtained from the World Bank statistics
over the period 1985-2011. Moreover, an important debate exists about the impact of
concentration on bank risk-taking.16 In any case, market structures like concentration
are largely considered as an important determinant of bank risk-taking. Using market
shares on the deposits market, an HHI index is constructed for each country measuring
the concentration on the deposit market.17 Finally, the inclusion of year ﬁxed-eﬀects in the
regressions allow to control for aggregate ﬂuctuations. In the next section, I will present
and discuss the results.
14The recent paper by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) also shed light on this important issue.
15Regressions using a larger set of covariates, notably bank level controls, can be found in the appendix.
16See Boyd and De Nicolò (2005) for an overview
17Recall that
HHIt =
n∑
i=0
(MarketSharei, t)
2
where n is the total number of banks on a specific market. A higher HHI index denotes a more concen-
trated deposits market. Correlation between HHI on the loans market and HHI on the deposits market is
0.95. It doesn’t make any differences to use the one or the other.
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5 Results
5.1 Baseline specification
In this section, I present and discuss the results from the baseline speciﬁcation (4.1). A
negative and signiﬁcant value for βˆ means that on average banks tend to be more leveraged
after the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme than before. Results are reported in
table 4. The ﬁrst two columns report regressions with only year ﬁxed-eﬀects and bank-ﬁxed
eﬀects. Each regression is estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the country-
level to correct for within-country serial correlation (Petersen (2009)). Nonetheless, correct
estimation of standard errors is challenging in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework. This
is why I also implement the method proposed in Bertrand et al. (2004) to address serial
correlation issues in the robustness checks section.
The ﬁrst two columns of table 4 show the basic impact of deposit insurance adoption
on bank risk-taking without any control variables. We observe an important and a very
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect, meaning that banks tend to increase their leverage after the
implementation of deposit insurance scheme. I then add the set of controls variables. The
coeﬃcients on deposit insurance adoption keep the same sign and magnitude, as well as
they remain highly signiﬁcant for both risk proxies.
The estimated coeﬃcient indicates that the leverage of banks tends to decrease by 2.3
percentage points (resp. 1.8 ppts) or 15.2% (resp 12%) after deposit insurance adoption.18
In the case of the log of z-score, adopting a deposit insurance scheme tends to reduce
the z-score by 14.79%.19 It is also possible to interpret these results in a diﬀerent way.
Irrespective of the percentage changes in the level of risk-taking reﬂected by these two
proxies, it is worth to know how these changes in risk-taking following deposit insurance
adoption compare to “natural” ﬂuctuations of risk-taking. Precisely, I want to relate the
magnitude of these eﬀects to the sample within standard deviations of the two risk-taking
measurements. In table 3, I report the overall, between and within standard deviation of
both the log of z-score and the Capital-to-Assets ratio computed on the sample of banks on
18It is the magnitude of the effect evaluated at the mean of the sample on which the deposit insurance
dummy is estimated: −0.0228/0.15. The magnitude of the effect becomes 20.73% when evaluated at the
mean of the full sample: −0.0228/0.11.
19This value is computed as follow 100 · [exp(c∗ − 1
2
· v∗(c∗)) − 1], where c∗ is the estimated coefficient
and v∗(c∗) is the estimated variance of c∗ as suggested by Kennedy (1981).
5 RESULTS 14
which the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption is estimated. It appears that implementation
of a deposit insurance scheme produces an increase in risk-taking corresponding to 32.85%
of one sample within standard deviation for the Capital-to-Assets ratio and 39.87% of one
sample within standard deviation for the log of z-score. 20
These ﬁrst results suggest that there exists a negative and signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and the bank ﬁnancial soundness.
This relation appears to be mainly driven by a rise in the leverage ratio: we capture an
increase of 15% in the leverage ratio of banks after deposit insurance adoption.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the literature (Keeley (1990), Berger et al. (1995),
Saunders and Wilson (1999), or Acharya et al. (2011)). Bank creditors are particularly
concerned by monitoring the amount of equity held by the bank. First it is the capital
cushion intended to absorb unexpected losses: the lower the Capital-to-Assets ratio, the
more fragile the bank in case of unexpected shocks. Second, a higher level of Capital-
to-Assets ratio signals that banks has more skin in the game and thus less incentives to
make risky investments. In presence of deposit insurance, depositors become much less
concerned by the bank Capital-to-Assets ratio because of the guarantees oﬀered (as shown
by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) or Nier and Baumann (2006)). After deposit
insurance adoption, banks being no longer charged for excessive risk-taking, shareholders
and management have strong incentives to reduce their Capital-to-Assets ratio to boost the
return on equity for a given return on assets. The adverse impact of deposit insurance on
bank leverage is actually largely recognised: “Indeed, the entire system of capital regulation
is the result of the recognition that incentives to take excessive risk arise as a result of
demand deposit and other elements of the safety net of banks.” (Admati et al. (2011)).
Compared with the previous work of Gropp and Vesala (2004), this paper isolates
the intensive margin eﬀect, that is to say the change in leverage for existing banks. It
is crucial because the identiﬁcation is otherwise contaminated by the artiﬁcial changes
in BankScope coverage. Moreover, their identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of deposit insurance
relies on time-series variation in only 4 European countries while I am using variation in
20These are the in-sample magnitudes of the risk-shifting effect of deposit insurance. When comparing
with the within standard deviation computed over the entire sample (and not just on the sample of banks
on which the effect of deposit insurance adoption is estimated), the out-sample magnitudes become much
larger: 49.43% (0.0228/0.0461227) for the Capital-to-Assets ratio and 54.26% (0.1592/0.2935417) for the
log of z-score.
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deposit insurance scheme in almost 54 countries. This ﬁnding also challenges the results
established by Gropp and Heider (2010). The authors ﬁnd that bank leverage is insensitive
to deposit insurance coverage. Two reasons may explain these contrasting results. First,
they focus on large banks of developed countries while I am working mainly with banks
in developing countries irrespective of their size. Second, their identiﬁcation strategy is
based on variations in deposit insurance coverage across countries. It is possible that
the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance scheme sends an important signal to
depositors and banks whereas variability in deposit insurance coverage is likely to be less
noticeable explaining why these variations generate less diﬀerences in banks behavior.
Overall these results exhibit some evidence that adopting a deposit insurance scheme
fosters risk-taking by reducing the capital buﬀer of banks by 15%. Before turning to
the most important part of this paper investigating the heterogeneous eﬀects of deposit
insurance adoption, I need to address three potential identiﬁcation issues.
5.2 Tests of Identification Strategy
The results established in the previous section seem to indicate that deposit insurance
adoption makes banks much more leveraged. Nonetheless, the identiﬁcation strategy sum-
marised in equation (4.1) may suﬀer from three problems. The ﬁrst one concerns the
common trends assumption: to conclude that the changes in leverage observed are caused
by deposit insurance adoption, we have to assume that in the absence of deposit insur-
ance adoption, the leverage ratio and the distance-to-default would have evolved similarly
between treatment and control groups.
Second, the identiﬁcation strategy may face a reverse causality issue. Indeed, we could
suspect that bank leverage starts to increase before deposit insurance adoption. This
increase in bank leverage can then raise the demand for insurance by depositors and force
the government to adopt a guarantee scheme. In this case, the coeﬃcient estimated by
equation (4.1) captures the eﬀect of an increase in bank risk-taking on the probability to
adopt a deposit insurance rather than vice versa.
Third and most importantly, identiﬁcation may suﬀer from a simultaneity bias. It is
possible to capture the eﬀect of another change in banking regulation occurring at the
same time as the deposit insurance implementation. Similarly, it is hard to separate out
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the eﬀects of country-speciﬁc shocks contemporaneous with the deposit insurance adoption
from the eﬀects of the deposit insurance adoption itself. In particular, countries may adopt
a deposit insurance scheme precisely at the time where they suﬀer from a severe ﬁnancial
crisis.
Common Trends Assumption It is quite diﬃcult to test the common trends assump-
tion, especially in a context in which the implementations of the law are staggered over
time. One immediate solution relies on the inclusion of country-year interactions terms.
While completely nonrestrictive, such a speciﬁcation is not possible in the current frame-
work.21 However, the inclusion of country-speciﬁc trends in the baseline regressions is
an alternative solution allowing the outcome of treatment and control groups to follow
diﬀerent trends in a limited but potentially revealing way (Angrist and Pischke (2008)).
Since I do not have any prior about the shape of these potential country-speciﬁc trends,
quadratic trends are also included in the regressions allowing for a more ﬂexible speciﬁca-
tion. In this case, the eﬀect of deposit insurance is identiﬁed from a break in the pattern
of bank’s risk-taking that is distinguishable from a smooth quadratic. The regressions
estimated are the following:
Riski,j,t = αi + β ·DIj,t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui +
∑
j
τlin. · Trendj,t + ǫi,j,t (5.1)
Riski,j,t = αi + β ·DIj,t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui +
∑
j
τlin. · Trendj,t +
∑
j
τquad. · Trend
2
j,t + ǫi,j,t (5.2)
Results are reported in table 6. All the previous conclusions remain largely unchanged
even after taking into account country-speciﬁc trends. The deposit insurance variable
keeps the expected signs in both regressions and the signiﬁcance remains very high. Con-
trolling for country-speciﬁc trends tends to lower the economic signiﬁcance of the eﬀet,
which nonetheless remains substantial : adopting a deposit insurance reduces the bank
21Because it is no longer possible to estimate the deposit insurance dummy which is country-year specific.
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capital buﬀer by 12.6% on average. An alternative way to check the sensitivity of the
results to the common trends assumption consists in using a diﬀerent control group. Find-
ing diﬀerent results should be a source of concerns. I run such a sensitivity test in the
appendix C and the conclusions are unaltered. It is thus unlikely that treatment and
control groups experience very diﬀerent evolutions of leverage ratio in such a way that it
could contaminate the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption.
Reverse Causality Another potential issue is that we cannot exclude a priori that a de-
posit insurance scheme is implemented in a country after bank risk-taking starts to increase
signiﬁcantly. A change in bank leverage observed by depositors can increase pressures on
government to adopt a system of deposit guarantees. Alternatively, growing international
competition may force banks to take more risk and then to lobby for implementing a
deposit insurance scheme preserving them from paying excessive deposit rates. In both
case, the identiﬁcation strategy may suﬀer from a reverse causality issue. To rule out this
possibility, I implement a falsiﬁcation test.22
For this purpose, the main deposit insurance dummy variable is replaced by a set of
dummy variables taking the value of one exactly τ years after or τ years before the true
adoption (leads and lags in a sense):


DI
Before
j, tˆj −τ
= 1 if t = tˆj − τ
DI
After
j, tˆj +τ
= 1 if t = tˆj + τ
where tˆj denotes the year of adoption in country j. Then I run the following regression:
Riski,j,t = αi + β ·DIj,t +
6∑
τ=1
λτ ·DI
Before
j, tˆj −τ
+
7∑
τ=1
λτ ·DI
After
j, tˆj +τ
+ γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t (5.3)
With this speciﬁcation, it is possible to assess whether an increase in risk-taking is observed
in the years preceding the deposit insurance adoption. In this case, some dummy variables
for the years before the true adoption should have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient. Finding such an eﬀect would be symptomatic of potential reverse causality.
The results can be found in table 7. The ﬁrst two columns shows the results from a
22Angrist and Pischke (2008) and Roberts and Whited (2011).
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speciﬁcation in which the reference year is set to be the year preceding adoption.23 We
observe that the dummy variables for the years preceding adoption are (i) almost never
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero –at least in the case of Capital-to-Assets ratio– and (ii)
systematically positive indicating a lower risk-taking before adoption. In contrast, all the
dummy variables associated with the year following adoption present a negative and highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect. These results indicates that both the leverage ratio and the distance-
to-default have regular patterns before adoption: we cannot ﬁnd any signiﬁcant break in
bank risk-taking before adoption, i.e. the leverage ratio or the distance-to-default start
to decrease signiﬁcantly only after the adoption.24 The next two columns investigates
a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation. Now, I include a dummy for all the periods around
the adoption year.25 This speciﬁcation is more in line with those from Autor (2003) or
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Results turn out to be even more convincing and
the conclusions remain the same: there is no evidence that risk-taking starts to increase
signiﬁcantly prior to adoption.
Simultaneity The most important concerns about the identiﬁcation strategy relates
to the possibility that deposit insurance adoption comes with other changes in ﬁnancial
regulation or with some country-speciﬁc aggregate shocks like banking crises (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2008) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)). To tackle this issue, I
use the data collected by IMF researchers (Abiad et al. (2010) and Valencia and Laeven
(2008)) concerning banking crises and ﬁnancial reforms across the world. The banking
crisis database provides the starting date and the ending date of 42 crisis episodes in 37
countries. I thus construct a dummy variable Crisisj, t taking the value of one for each crisis
episode. The ﬁnancial reforms database covers 91 countries over 1973-2005. It provides
various index of ﬁnancial reforms including an index relative to prudential regulations and
supervision of the banking sector which are the kind of reforms the most likely to aﬀect
the leverage ratio of banks. This indicator sums up four distinct dimensions and takes
23The graphical representation of this specification can be found in figures 11 and 12 in appendix.
24A source of concerns could be the downward trend that we can observed by looking at figures 7 and 8.
In both cases, the risk-taking tends to slightly increase with time. However, we clearly identify a significant
break in this downward trend exactly at the time of adoption: bank risk-taking increases much more than
what we could have otherwise expected according to this long term trend.
25Note that the reference year is no longer explicitly defined.
5 RESULTS 19
values between 0 and 3 in which higher values denote more regulated banking sectors.26
Based on these two indicators, I run the following regressions aiming to control for
simultaneous changes in regulation and banking crises:
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω · Crisisj, t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t (5.4)
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·Reformj, t + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t (5.5)
We expect a positive coeﬃcient for the ﬁnancial reform indicators and a negative
coeﬃcient for the banking crisis dummy. In the case in which the eﬀect of deposit insurance
captures mainly the eﬀect of simultaneous changes in regulation and banking crises, we
should observe a large reduction in the magnitude (and possibly in the signiﬁcance) of the
coeﬃcient for the deposit insurance dummy. Results of theses regressions are presented in
table 8. The ﬁrst two columns replicates the baseline results. The third and the fourth
columns present results including the banking crisis dummy while the ﬁfth and the sixth
columns show the results after adding the banking supervision index. In both case, the
coeﬃcient for each indicator is insigniﬁcant. Above all, their economic signiﬁcance is
very small: the magnitude of the coeﬃcients associated to banking crisis and banking
supervision are ﬁve to ten times smaller than the coeﬃcient of deposit insurance adoption.
In columns 7 and 8, the banking supervision index is replaced by the overall ﬁnancial
reforms index.27 Results indicate that ﬁnancial liberalization seems to be positively related
to bank risk-taking but the inclusion of this indicator in the set of regressors continue to
be without any eﬀect on the estimated impact of deposit insurance adoption. Finally, in
columns 9 and 10 I present results of regressions using both indicators simultaneously.
The most important message from these regressions is that the economic and statistical
signiﬁcance of deposit insurance adoption is only marginally aﬀected by inclusion of these
indicators: the maximum diminution corresponds to 3% of the magnitude of the eﬀect.
Finally, note that bias related to simultaneous changes in banking regulation, if present,
is likely to be a downward bias. These last twenty years, the regulatory framework of
26Note that the limited time coverage of this indicator reduces the sample size. To keep sample size
similar across regressions, I assign the value of the year 2005 to the financial reform indicator for the years
2006-2011.
27This index aggregates seven dimensions to obtain a single liberalization index for each economy and
for each year.
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banking activities has been more directed toward higher capital ratio than the opposite as
evidenced by the successive implementation of Basel I and Basel II.28 It is even possible to
think that such simultaneous regulatory changes could be designed to mitigate the perverse
eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption. Hence, regulatory changes implemented at the same
time as deposit insurance are likely to induce an increase in the Capital-to-Assets ratio
going against the expected eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption: we cannot exclude that
we are under-estimating the true eﬀect.
To summarise, the identiﬁcation strategy does not seem to suﬀer from simultaneity:
even after taking into account banking crisis and changes in banking regulations, the eﬀect
of deposit insurance remains mostly unchanged. After having considered carefully the
potential biases that could aﬀect the baseline results, we can turn to the most important
contribution of this paper.
5.3 An Analysis of the Heterogeneity of Banks’ Response: the Compet-
itive Effects of Deposits Insurance Adoption
The results presented in the previous sections demonstrate that deposit insurance adoption
adversely impacts banks’ capital buﬀer. The theory predicts that deposit insurance should
relax the market discipline from depositors. Accordingly, banks have strong incentives
to adopt more risky behaviors because creditors no longer price eﬃciently these risky
strategies. In particular, we expect that banks would operate with much lower Capital-
to-Assets ratio in presence of deposit insurance. Consistent with these predictions, I ﬁnd
that deposit insurance adoption reduces the capital buﬀer of banks by 15%.
However the eﬀect identiﬁed previously is an average effect over the whole sample of
banks and it is quite plausible that adopting a deposit insurance should have heteroge-
neous eﬀects on banks along various dimensions. For instance, number of authors suggest
that deposit insurance should beneﬁt mainly to small banks (Calomiris and White (1994),
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008) for instance). From the
regulators perspective, it is very important to improve the knowledge about the hetero-
geneity in banks’ response and to identify which banks react the most to deposit insurance
28At least in the countries on which the effect of deposit insurance adoption is estimated, that is to say
mainly developing countries. This is also what we observed in the figures 1 and 2
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adoption.
The present section investigates these likely heterogeneous responses of banks. The
main conclusion is that deposit insurance has important competitive eﬀects on the banking
industry: adoption of deposit insurance scheme seems to beneﬁt mostly to small, non
systemic and well-capitalised banks. First, I ﬁnd that banks’ response to the introduction
of deposit guarantees is stronger for banks with small initial market shares. Similarly, the
response of banks to deposit insurance adoption is negatively related to the initial systemic
importance of banks. I thus do not ﬁnd any eﬀect for the largest and the most systemic
banks. In both cases, these ﬁndings can be explained by the fact that large and systemic
banks beneﬁted from implicit state guarantees before deposit insurance adoption, i.e. the
Too Big to Fail hypothesis. As a consequence, they already escaped market discipline and
they do not take advantage from adoption of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Second,
I show that bank responsiveness is negatively related to their initial leverage leading to
a convergence process among banks: those which are initially highly leveraged appear to
be insensitive to deposit insurance adoption. This second features of deposit insurance
adoption could be related to capital requirement: banks with a high initial leverage have
much less room to increase it before capital constraint binds.
These results point out that deposit insurance adoption does not generate a build-up of
fragility among a small set of banks, be they initially highly leveraged, relatively large or
too-systemic-to-fail. However, they also indicate that the whole domestic banking industry
tends to be less adequately capitalised after the implementation of deposit insurance.
The Mitigating Effects of Relative Size and Systemic Importance There is no
reason to consider that banks should react uniformly to the introduction of a deposit in-
surance scheme. The responses of banks depends entirely on the implicit subsidy they
receive from the deposit insurance which is largely determined by the intensity of the
market discipline existing before adoption: the stronger the market discipline ex ante, the
larger the subsidy ex post. For instance, a bank that would not be subject to market disci-
pline ex ante should not react at all to the deposit insurance adoption. If we thus assume
that banks that are perceived as systemically important already beneﬁt from implicit state
guarantees, we should observe a negative relation between the responses of banks and their
5 RESULTS 22
systemic importance. In this paragraph, I present evidence supporting this hypothesis.
For this purpose, I consider two indicators of systemic importance: the bank market
share in terms of assets, i.e. the domestic relative size, and the ratio of bank assets to GDP.
However, these indicators of systemic importance are likely to be impacted by deposit
insurance adoption. To address this endogeneity issue (Roberts and Whited (2011)), I
use the pre-treatment value of these two measures. Say diﬀerently, I utilise indicators
computed over the period preceding adoption. Formally, I deﬁne the two indicators of ex
ante systemic importance as an average value over the period before adoption (excluding
the year of adoption)29:
MarketSharei, j =
∑
t<tˆj −1
MarketSharei, j, t
(tˆj − 1 − t0)
AssetToGDPi, j =
∑
t<tˆj −1
AssetToGDPi, j, t
(tˆj − 1 − t0)
Note that the implementation of this methodology drop a large number of observa-
tions.30 I then extend the baseline speciﬁcation by including interaction terms between
these indicators and the deposit insurance adoption dummy:
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t ·MarketSharei, j + µ ·MarketSharei, j (5.6)
+θt ·MarketSharei, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t ·AssetToGDPi, j + µ ·AssetToGDPi, j (5.7)
+θt ·AssetToGDPi, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
where ui and θt are bank and year ﬁxed-eﬀects. The identiﬁcation of ω relies of on
the comparison within the same country of the response of banks with diﬀerent systemic
29The results presented below are robust to alternative definitions of the ex ante indicators used. In
unreported regressions, I confirm the results using indicators of systemic importance computed over the
period that precedes adoption including the year of adoption, or excluding the year of adoption and the
year immediately before. I have also used indicators computed as the last value one or two periods before
adoption.
30It is so because all the countries having adopted a deposit insurance scheme before the 90’s have no
observations for these years. But most of these observations are not used to identify the effect of deposit
insurance adoption in the baseline specification
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importance to deposit insurance adoption. We expect to ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient for β
and a positive coeﬃcient for ω: as banks become more and more systemically important,
the intensity of their response should diminish.
The set of interaction terms between time ﬁxed-eﬀects and ex ante indicators (θt ·
MarketSharei, j and θt · AssetToGDPi, j) is crucial for the identiﬁcation. It aims to control
for the fact that banks with diﬀerent ex ante systemic importance may also have diﬀerent
evolutions of risk-taking over time within the same country (independently of the deposit
insurance adoption). I do not want to confound the heterogeneity in the risk-shifting
eﬀect of deposit insurance depending on the ex ante systemic importance with “natural”
diﬀerences in the evolution of risk-taking over time for banks having diﬀerent ex ante
systemic importance. The results are presented in tables 9 and 10. In the ﬁrst two
columns, I replicate the baseline speciﬁcation to conﬁrm that the previous ﬁndings remain
valid after the loss of observations caused by the construction of systemic indicators. The
next two columns present the results of speciﬁcation (5.6) and (5.7) without any covariates
while the last two columns include them.
The ﬁrst two columns conﬁrm that introducing a deposit insurance scheme increases
the leverage ratio of banks and then translates into higher risk of insolvency. Note that the
loss of observations discussed just above induces only a marginal change in the magnitude
of βˆ in both regressions conﬁrming that most of these lost observations are without any
eﬀects on the estimation of βˆ. When considering the results of speciﬁcation (5.6) and (5.7),
it appears that deposit insurance adoption continues to have a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the banks’ capital buﬀer, i.e. βˆ < 0 . However, the coeﬃcient associated with the
interaction terms DIj,t · MarketSharei, j and DIj,t · AssetToGDPi, j is positive and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero: the response of banks to the implementation of deposit insurance is
strongly mitigated by systemic importance of banks.
For instance, in the case of the Capital-to-Assets ratio, the eﬀect of deposit insurance
diminishes with systemic importance and becomes indistinguishable from zero for banks
having an ex ante domestic market share larger than 20%, which corresponds to banks
within the last decile of the distribution. Similarly, the eﬀect of deposit insurance becomes
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when banks have an ex ante ratio of assets over GDP
larger than 31%: those banks belong to the top 5% of the distribution. All these results
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remain valid if I use alternative indicators like the market share in terms of deposits or
liabilities and the ratio of liabilities over GDP.
There is an important conclusion that can be drawn from these ﬁndings. First, the
limited set of banks that can be considered as systemically important, those who are
commonly referred to as Too Big to Fail, seems to be insensitive to adoption of deposit
insurance. One plausible explanation is that these very large banks were perceived by
depositors as beneﬁting from implicit state guarantees before deposit insurance adoption.
Alternatively, we could think about systemic importance as a source of market power that
makes the banks less sensitive to market discipline by depositors. In both cases, it strongly
reduces the implicit subsidy they get from deposit insurance. Conversely, small banks are
intensively monitored by depositors in absence of safety net and they are immediately
punished for any diminution of their capital buﬀer. As a result, they take the greatest
advantage from the relaxation of market discipline induced by deposit insurance adoption.
These results are consistent with previous ﬁndings of Ioannidou and Penas (2010) show-
ing that diﬀerences between large and small banks in terms of risky loans origination are
reduced by deposit insurance. They are also in line with the paper of Gropp and Vesala
(2004), but the strategy implemented in this paper has two advantages compared with
their study. First, it controls for the possible endogenous reaction of systemic indicators
to deposit insurance adoption as well as for the bias introduced by changes in coverage of
BankScope. Second it does not use ad hoc threshold to deﬁne systemic banks. However,
the present results could be perceived as inconsistent with those of Demirguc-Kunt and
Huizinga (2012) who establish that systemically large banks are subject to greater market
discipline because they appear to be Too Big to Save.31 But, both ﬁndings can be recon-
ciled if we consider that deposit insurance is not a credible protection for those banks that
are Too Big to Save: they are thus not impacted by deposit insurance adoption as shown
in this paper.
Finally, the evidence presented in this section suggest that, by allowing small and
non systemic banks to reduce their capital buﬀer, deposit insurance adoption is likely to
promote competition on the banking market by reducing the comparative advantage of
31Note that the authors show the opposite pattern when using the market share which is now consistent
with the results established in this paper.
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large and systemic ﬁnancial institutions.32 Interestingly, this eﬀect has often been stated
as an important motivation for adopting a system of deposit insurance (Garcia (2000) and
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008)).
Deposit Insurance Adoption and Leverage: a Convergence Process Across
Banks It is equally important to examine how the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit in-
surance is distributed across banks with heterogeneous initial capital buffer. From an
aggregate perspective, understanding which banks react the most to deposit insurance
adoption according to their initial leverage is essential. Indeed, ﬁnancial stability is im-
pacted diﬀerently depending on whether a small group of highly leveraged banks tends to
become even more under-capitalised or whether safer banks start to catch up more risky
ones. In the ﬁrst case, we face a build-up of fragility in a small segment of the banking
market. In the second case, the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption is spread
across the entire banking system.
To investigate this question, I use the same methodology as before. I start by com-
puting indicators of ex ante leverage by taking the average value before adoption of two
proxies for leverage: the Capital-to-Assets ratio and the Liabilities-to-Equity ratio. Then, I
interact these indicators with the deposit insurance dummy. Formally, I run the following
regressions:
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t · CARi, j + µ · CARi, j (5.8)
+θt · CARi, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
Riski,j,t = α+ β ·DIj,t + ω ·DIj,t · LiabToEquityi, j + µ · LiabToEquityi, j (5.9)
+θt · LiabToEquityi, j + γ ·Xi,j,t + θt + ui + ǫi,j,t
The results can be found in the table 11 and 12 and they are unambiguous. We
observe a negative impact of ex ante leverage ratio on the banks’ response to deposit
insurance adoption: the least leveraged banks before the reform are those reacting the most
32Cordella and Yeyati (2002) or Matutes and Vives (1996) examine theoretically the relationships between
deposit insurance and competition
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intensively to deposit insurance adoption. For instance, the coeﬃcient in the third column
of table 12 indicates that deposit insurance adoption has no eﬀect on the Capital-to-
Assets ratio when banks have an initial Capital-to-Assets ratio (resp. Liabilities-to-Equity
ratio) below 5% (resp. above 18): the 10% most leveraged banks are thus insensitive to
introduction of deposit guarantees.
Following the implementation of deposit insurance, deposits ﬁnancing becomes rela-
tively cheaper compare to capital. Indeed, deposit insurance schemes induce important
deviations from the Modigliani-Miller world (Admati et al. (2011)). Hence, in absence of
actuarially fair premia (in particular risk-based premia), highly capitalised banks should
substitute deposits to equity. Otherwise, they would implicitly subsidise most leveraged
banks, because they would pay the same premium without taking full advantage from the
cheaper source of funding provided by insured deposits. This explains why we observe a
larger response from the most capitalised banks. In contrast, the absence of reaction from
the least capitalised banks could also be explained by regulatory capital constraints: they
have less room to reduce their Capital-to-Assets ratio by substituting deposits to equity
ﬁnancing. 33 Accordingly, deposit insurance adoption tends to make the distribution of
leverage ratios across banks much more concentrated around its mean. The between stan-
dard deviation of the Capital-to-Assets ratio decreases from 0.12 before adoption to 0.10
after adoption. This pattern can also be observed by looking at ﬁgure 3.
All the ﬁndings established in this section are robust to the inclusion of country-
speciﬁc trends, both linear and quadratic. What is more, the results are also robust to the
inclusion of banking crisis index and banking supervision index as well as interaction terms
of these two indicators with the various dimensions used to detect the heterogeneity. In
other words, the heterogeneous responses of banks to deposit insurance adoption cannot
be confused with the heterogeneous responses of banks to banking crisis and changes in
banking supervision. All these robustness checks are presented in tables 15, 16, 17 and 18
in appendix.
In this section, I bring evidence that small, non systemic and well-capitalised banks
react the most to deposit insurance adoption. There are two important lessons from this
33However regulatory constraints cannot fully explain the relation exhibited because even in restricting
the sample to banks having an initial Capital-to-Assets ratio higher than 15% or 20%, we continue to
capture a negative relation between initial leverage and banks’ reaction. Results available upon request.
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analysis. First, we observe a convergence across banks in terms of leverage ratio after
the implementation of deposit insurance: initially well-capitalised banks increase much
more their leverage after deposit insurance adoption than initially highly leveraged banks.
Second, deposit insurance adoption has some important competitive effects by removing
the comparative advantage of large and systemic banks and by improving competition
on the banking market. But, if not supplemented with additional regulatory constraints,
adopting a deposit insurance also makes the whole banking system less well-capitalised
and thus less resilient to large and widespread shocks.
6 Robustness checks
In this section, I present additional robustness checks. First, I use the ﬁrst-diﬀerence esti-
mators to conﬁrm the validity of the results under weaker assumptions. Then, I deal with
a crucial issue in a quasi diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework: the so-called serial correlation
issue. For the sake of brevity, the other robustness checks are presented in the appendix
C.
First-Difference estimation The baseline speciﬁcation (4.1) estimates the impact of
deposit insurance adoption in a fixed-effects framework. However, the consistency of these
estimates relies on strong assumptions. In this paragraph, I present the results of re-
gressions using the first-difference estimators. Under the assumption of homoskedasticity
and no serial correlation in the error term, the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators is more eﬃcient
than the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimators. In contrast, consistency of the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estima-
tor is obtained under a weaker assumption: the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the idiosyncratic error
must be serially uncorrelated, i.e error terms must follow a random walk (Wooldridge
(2010)). Above all, the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimation helps to know whether the deposit in-
surance adoption has an immediate impact on leverage. Precisely, I regress the following
speciﬁcation:
∆Riski,j,t = β · ∆DIj,t + γ · ∆Xi,j,t +∆θt +∆ǫi,j,t
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where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator. The results are presented in table 13. Additionally,
I also perform an estimation allowing for bank-speciﬁc trends.34 This model writes:
Riski,j,t = α+ β · DIj,t + γ · Xi,j,t + θt + ui + φ · Trendt · ui + ǫi,j,t
If we ﬁrst-diﬀerence this model, we get:
∆Riski,j,t = β · ∆DIj,t + γ · ∆Xi,j,t +∆θt + ui +∆ǫi,j,t
Observe that we have now bank ﬁxed-eﬀects directly in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced equation.
Hence, we can estimate this equation by using the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator or by diﬀerencing
again. The results being roughly the same I only present those from the ﬁxed-eﬀects
regressions. These results are also reported in table 13.
The coeﬃcient in table 13 largely conﬁrms the previous results. First, the two risk
indicators give additional evidence that adoption of deposit insurance favors high leverage
ratios even under weaker statistical assumptions. Second, while the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator
assesses the long term eﬀect of deposit insurance, the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator captures
the immediate jump in risk-taking. Here, we see that providing guarantees on deposits
has an immediate eﬀect on the bank capital buﬀer. This short term reaction of banks to
deposit insurance adoption is lower in magnitude than their long term response. Third,
allowing for bank-speciﬁc trends in leverage and risk of insolvency gives almost the same
results as before. We continue to observe an eﬀect that is statistically and economically
signiﬁcant.
Serial correlation In their inﬂuential paper, Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that estima-
tions based on the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method are subject to a possibly severe serial
correlation problems. To overcome this issue, they propose a range of solutions. The
present paper implements the solution that proposes to ignore time-series information
when computing standard errors. First, the risk-taking measurements are regressed on
bank and year ﬁxed-eﬀects and possibly, on all the covariates previously used except the
34These class of models are called correlated random trend models. See Wooldridge (2010) p. 315 and
also http://www.cemmap.ac.uk/resources/imbens_wooldridge/slides_11.pdf
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deposit insurance adoption dummy. The residuals of the treated banks only35 are then
divided into two groups: residuals from years before adoption, and those from years after
adoption. Finally, the eﬀect of adoption is estimated by OLS: the residuals are regressed
on the deposit insurance dummy in a two periods model. The results are shown in table
14.
We are mostly interested by the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients and it appears
that all the coeﬃcients presented in this table are highly signiﬁcant. In conclusion, the
potential serial correlation issue threatening the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of policy
change does not appear to be a crucial problem in the present paper.
Further robustness checks In the appendix C, I run several additional robustness
checks: I run the baseline speciﬁcation on a sample restricted to treated banks i.e. banks
having at least one observation before and after a deposit insurance adoption, I consider the
potential problem posed by Mergers and Acquisitions, I replicates the baseline regression
on various sub-samples, and I add bank-level control variables. Replications of the baseline
speciﬁcation using the z-score in level and various versions of the log of z-score can also
be found in this appendix C.
7 Conclusion
This paper empirically investigates the causal relation existing between adoption of deposit
insurance and bank risk-taking and it underlines the prominent role of changes in leverage
in this process. This is clearly a topical issue as shown by the recent events in Cyprus
in 2013. This moral hazard issue related to state guarantees oﬀered to banks has been
largely discussed when governments and central banks have decided to bailout the banking
industry in the midst of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Focusing on the eﬀect of deposit
insurance adoption on bank capital buﬀer, this paper aims to provide a contribution to
this very challenging issue.
This study shows that we observe a signiﬁcant increase in bank risk of insolvency
after introduction of deposit insurance. The magnitude of this eﬀect is roughly 30% to
35i.e. those facing an adoption during the period covered.
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45% of one sample standard deviation of the various risk indicators used. Above all, this
paper argues that the downward shift in bank distance-to-default is mainly caused by an
increase in bank leverage: banks tend to reduce their capital buﬀer by almost 15% after
implementation of deposit insurance. These results are consistent with both the theoretical
and the empirical literature.
In order to rule out the possibility of spurious correlations due to reverse causation
or simultaneity, I run various sensitivity checks. In particular, I run a falsiﬁcation test
showing that bank capital buﬀer starts to decrease signiﬁcantly only after deposit insurance
adoption and not before. Second, I also discuss the possibility that the adverse eﬀect
captured in this paper could be related to simultaneous changes in banking regulation or
by contemporaneous banking crises. Tests provided in this paper show that it is quite
unlikely.
Most importantly, I bring robust evidence that relatively large and systemic banks as
well as the most highly leveraged banks tend to be unresponsive to the deposit insurance
adoption. I cannot capture any signiﬁcant change in the leverage ratio for the top 10%
most systemic banks or most leveraged banks. The ﬁrst result is consistent with the view
that systemic banks are not subject to market discipline because they beneﬁt from implicit
state guarantees. Hence, they do not react to the introduction of explicit deposit insur-
ance. As such, deposit insurance could have important competitive effects by removing the
comparative advantage of large and systemic banks. The second result is interesting be-
cause it sheds light on the convergence process induced by deposit insurance adoption. To
avoid to subsidise highly leveraged banks, well-capitalised banks reduce signiﬁcantly more
their capital buﬀer that banks with a lower initial capital buﬀer. Overall, these results
oﬀer contrasting views on deposit insurance: only the less fragile banks seem to increase
their leverage after deposit insurance adoption but the whole domestic banking industry is
less adequately capitalised after implementation of deposit guarantees. Similarly, deposit
insurance adoption seems to promote banking competition by relaxcing the market disci-
pline faced by small and non-systemic banks rather than by removing the implicit subsidy
oﬀered to large and systemic banks.
All the results presented in this paper tend to conﬁrm that deposit insurance adoption
has unintended consequences: it induces a strategic response from banks which increase
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their leverage to exploit the put option value of deposit insurance. These ﬁndings are in
line with previous and recent research concerning the relaxation of market discipline caused
by deposit insurance adoption (Karas et al. (2013) for instance). Recently, in reaction to
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 many countries have decided to increase the amount of deposits
covered by guarantee funds (USA and EU for instance). Other countries (Australia, New-
Zealand) have adopted an explicit deposit insurance scheme for the ﬁrst time in their
history. The European Union plan to implement a uniﬁed deposit insurance system in the
very next years as part of the Banking Union. The results established in this paper reaﬃrm
the necessity to control adequately the perverse incentives that deposit insurance provides
to banks with a particular focus on the capital buﬀer of banks. The decision to include a
raw leverage ratio in the Basel III regulatory standards to complement the traditional risk-
weighted capital ratios can be viewed as an important step in this direction. But results
presented in this paper suggest that introduction of risk-based premia, in particular premia
based on the capital buﬀer of banks (as proposed by Bond and Crocker (1993) and more
recently by Acharya et al. (2010)) would help to mitigate this unintended consequence of
deposit insurance.
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Note: These figures show the evolutions of the average and the median Capital-to-Assets ratio (top) and log
of z-score (bottom) across time computed over the sample of banks that face a deposit insurance adoption.
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Figure 3 & 4
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Note: These figures show the distribution of the average Capital-to-Assets ratio (top) and log of z-score
(bottom) before (in blue) and after (in white) deposit insurance adoption. The sample of banks is restricted
to banks for which we have observations before and after deposit insurance adoption. There is only one
observation per banks and per period (before/after). A lower value signals an increase in leverage (top) or
in the probability of default (bottom).
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Table 1: Deposit Insurance Scheme. Year of Adoption
Country Name Year of Adoption Nb of banks Country Name Year of Adoption Nb of banks
USA 1934 9957 BRAZIL 1996 166
NORWAY 1961 156 KOREA REP. OF 1996 25
INDIA 1961 97 LITHUANIA 1996 13
DOMINICAN REP. 1962 49 THAILAND 1997 29
PHILIPPINES 1963 61 SLOVAKIA 1997 24
GERMANY 1966 2237 MACEDONIA 1997 15
CANADA 1967 80 CROATIA 1998 45
FINLAND 1969 18 LATVIA 1998 33
JAPAN 1971 699 ALGERIA 1998 15
BELGIUM 1975 92 JAMAICA 1998 9
NETHERLANDS 1979 66 ESTONIA 1998 7
FRANCE 1980 492 INDONESIA 1998 105
SPAIN 1980 298 BULGARIA 1999 33
UNITED KINGDOM 1982 284 ECUADOR 1999 23
TURKEY 1983 63 BELARUS 2000 18
SWITZERLAND 1984 407 KAZAKHSTAN 2000 23
BANGLADESH 1984 34 EL SALVADOR 2000 18
ICELAND 1985 13 BAHAMAS 2000 24
COLOMBIA 1985 41 VIETNAM 2000 37
KENYA 1986 43 HONDURAS 2001 24
TRINIDAD & TOB. 1986 10 NICARAGUA 2001 6
DENMARK 1987 132 SLOVENIA 2001 25
ITALY 1987 1253 CYPRUS 2001 18
SRI LANKA 1987 12 JORDAN 2001 15
AUSTRIA 1988 298 BOSNIA-HERZ. 2002 15
NIGERIA 1988 53 BOLIVIA 2002 14
IRELAND 1989 44 UKRAINE 2002 57
LUXEMBOURG 1989 145 GUATEMALA 2002 40
SERBIA 1989 39 ALBANIA 2002 11
MEXICO 1990 54 MALTA 2003 8
PERU 1991 25 URUGUAY 2003 33
MOROCCO 1993 17 RUSSIAN FED. 2004 900
HUNGARY 1993 39 PARAGUAY 2004 23
BAHRAIN 1994 23 MOLDOVA REP. 2004 20
TANZANIA 1994 28 ARMENIA 2005 14
UGANDA 1994 11 SINGAPORE 2006 28
POLAND 1995 72 MALAYSIA 2006 56
OMAN 1995 9 HONG KONG 2007 64
GREECE 1995 41 AZERBAIJAN 2007 20
PORTUGAL 1995 55 AUSTRALIA 2008 64
ARGENTINA 1995 109 YEMEN 2008 13
CZECH REPUBLIC 1995 36 NEW ZEALAND 2009 22
SWEDEN 1996 110 CAMEROON 2011 7
SUDAN 1996 17 GABON 2011 5
The following countries don’t have explicit deposit insurance scheme: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, China People’s Rep., Costa Rica, Egypt, Georgia Rep. Of, Ghana, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast,
Kuwait, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia and Zambia
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Main Sample
ln(z-score) 220643 3.12 1.03 2.49 3.23 3.83
z-score 221654 35.61 39.86 11.86 25.24 46.02
Capital-to-Asset ratio 222099 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.12
Return on Average Asset 221656 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01
Log of total asset 222099 6.39 2.69 4.55 5.69 7.48
Net Int Rev / Avg Assets 221153 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Deposit market share 222099 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Liquid asset/asset 222099 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.21
Cost To Income Ratio 219996 0.71 0.38 0.57 0.67 0.77
HHI index on deposits 2473 0.2633 0.2235 0.1242 0.1964 0.2994
GDP growth (annual %) 2473 0.0396 0.0424 0.0199 0.0401 0.0607
Inflation (annual %) 2473 20.9726 176.7996 2.2889 4.7332 9.6657
Log of GDP per capita 2473 10.6145 2.1880 9.3571 10.3344 11.9793
Sample Limited to Banks Facing Deposit Insurance Adoption
ln(z-score) 29162 2.56 1.05 1.95 2.66 3.27
z-score 29431 20.53 23.31 6.84 14.12 26.13
Capital-to-Asset ratio 29560 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.17
Return on Average Asset 29432 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02
Log of total asset 29560 8.18 2.91 6.22 7.65 9.56
Net Int Rev / Avg Assets 29327 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06
Deposit market share 29560 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02
Liquid asset/asset 29560 0.30 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.40
Cost To Income Ratio 28893 0.69 0.40 0.50 0.65 0.81
HHI index on deposits 1125 0.2579 0.2091 0.1317 0.1887 0.2945
GDP growth (annual %) 1125 0.0377 0.0463 0.0197 0.0415 0.0620
Inflation (annual %) 1125 31.6439 230.0894 2.3881 4.6909 9.6394
Log of GDP per capita 1125 10.3893 2.2747 9.0096 9.9409 11.4700
Table 3: Sample Standard Deviation of Risk-Taking
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Capital-to-Asset ratio overall .1455605 .1318104 N = 29560
between .1195495 n = 20703
within .069414 T-bar = 10.7279
ln(z-score) overall 2.560537 1.049044 N = 29162
between 1.004775 n = 3195
within .3992732 T-bar = 9.12739
This table provides additional descriptive statistics for banks facing an adoption. N is the number of observation.
Mean is the mean value. Within Std. Dev. is the standard deviation of within banks, i.e. the deviation from
each individual’s average. Between Std. Dev. is the standard deviation across banks, i.e the standard deviation of
individual’s average. p25, Median and p75 are the 25th, the 50th and the 75th percentile threshold.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Before and After Adoption
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Before Deposit Insurance Adoption
ln(z-score) 3313 2.3469 1.0242 1.7718 2.4359 3.0115
Capital-to-Asset ratio 3404 0.1462 0.1187 0.0733 0.1090 0.1806
Leverage 3399 10.9554 18.1110 4.5370 8.1581 12.6336
After Deposit Insurance Adoption
ln(z-score) 6673 2.2310 1.0195 1.6173 2.3326 2.9276
Capital-to-Asset ratio 6786 0.1313 0.1062 0.0727 0.1032 0.1500
Leverage 6783 11.2720 17.9915 5.6530 8.6882 12.7413
Differences
ln(z-score) -0.116**
Capital-to-Asset ratio -0.015**
Leverage 0.317
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. This table provides descriptive statistics before and after deposit insurance adoption for banks
facing an adoption. N is the number of observation. Mean is the mean value. SD is the standard deviation of
banks. p25, Median and p75 are the 25th, the 50th and the 75th percentile threshold.
Table 5: Baseline speciﬁcation
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0228** -0.1592** -0.0180** -0.1687**
(0.0029) (0.0003) (0.0056) (0.0001)
HHI index on deposit 0.0125 -0.0971
(0.3769) (0.3257)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0184 0.5505
(0.7388) (0.1877)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.8089) (0.4513)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0387* 0.0666
(0.0129) (0.5764)
Observations 222,099 220,643 222,099 220,643
Number of id 20,703 20,697 20,703 20,697
Adjusted R-squared 0.0056 0.0169 0.0072 0.0180
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects
model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not include the contribution of bank
fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 6: Speciﬁcation with linear and quadratic country-speciﬁc trends
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0188* -0.1266** -0.0186** -0.1234** -0.0169* -0.1154** -0.0160** -0.1138**
(0.0213) (0.0006) (0.0057) (0.0008) (0.0210) (0.0000) (0.0076) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0245 0.0587 0.0187 0.0543
(0.1752) (0.5608) (0.3055) (0.5641)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0639 -0.0827 -0.0392 -0.0740
(0.1676) (0.7842) (0.3827) (0.7877)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.7117) (0.7105) (0.7873) (0.1528)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0431 0.2835 -0.0920** -0.0124
(0.1607) (0.0889) (0.0099) (0.9371)
Observations 222,099 220,643 222,099 220,643 222,099 220,643 222,099 220,643
Number of id 20,703 20,697 20,703 20,697 20,703 20,697 20,703 20,697
Adjusted R-squared 0.0218 0.0495 0.0231 0.0500 0.0272 0.0596 0.0290 0.0598
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trends Linear Linear Linear Linear Lin. & Quad. Lin. & Quad. Lin. & Quad. Lin. & Quad.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted
R-squared does not include the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 7: Falsiﬁcation test
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Years ≤ -6 0.0112 0.1006
(0.2165) (0.0915)
Years -6 0.0073 0.0021
(0.2094) (0.9565)
Years -5 0.0179 0.1157* 0.0089 0.0157
(0.0645) (0.0443) (0.1824) (0.7036)
Year -4 0.0123 0.1102* 0.0033 0.0102
(0.0914) (0.0167) (0.6388) (0.7946)
Year -3 0.0109 0.0899* 0.0021 -0.0100
(0.1793) (0.0147) (0.8199) (0.8418)
Year -2 0.0033 0.0458 -0.0054 -0.0541
(0.5621) (0.0746) (0.5050) (0.3003)
Year -1 -0.0087 -0.0999
(0.3505) (0.1127)
Year of adoption -0.0013 -0.0385 -0.0101 -0.1384*
(0.7279) (0.1642) (0.2622) (0.0218)
Year 1 -0.0163** -0.1095** -0.0250* -0.2094**
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0331) (0.0050)
Year 2 -0.0248** -0.1457** -0.0335* -0.2456**
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0157) (0.0066)
Year 3 -0.0288** -0.1511** -0.0375* -0.2510**
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0164) (0.0075)
Year 4 -0.0211** -0.0995* -0.0298* -0.1994*
(0.0009) (0.0107) (0.0158) (0.0140)
Year 5 -0.0088 -0.0681 -0.0175 -0.1680*
(0.2910) (0.1827) (0.1115) (0.0419)
Year 6 -0.0144* -0.1008* -0.0231 -0.2007*
(0.0370) (0.0438) (0.0505) (0.0248)
Years ≥ 7 -0.0200* -0.1293* -0.0287* -0.2292*
(0.0102) (0.0387) (0.0231) (0.0229)
Observations 222,099 220,643 222,099 220,643
Number of id 20,703 20,697 20,703 20,697
Adjusted R-squared 0.0077 0.0181 0.0077 0.0181
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variables Year "i" or Year "-i" are dummy variables taking the value of one
exactly "i" years before or after deposit insurance adoption. The variables Years ≥ "i" or Years ≤ "-i" are dummy
variable taking the value of one "i" years, "i+1" years, "i+2" years... after deposit insurance adoption or "-i" years,
"-i-1" years, "-i-2" years... before deposit insurance adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value
in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared
does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 8: Controlling for Banking Crises and Simultaneous Changes in Banking Regulation
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0178** -0.1681** -0.0183* -0.1650** -0.0178* -0.1643** -0.0181* -0.1642**
(0.0064) (0.0001) (0.0154) (0.0007) (0.0162) (0.0005) (0.0168) (0.0007)
HHI index on deposit 0.0126 -0.0969 0.0043 -0.1366 0.0026 -0.1546 0.0047 -0.1353
(0.3755) (0.3295) (0.7949) (0.2135) (0.8768) (0.1554) (0.7792) (0.2240)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0098 0.5724 -0.0267 0.6787 -0.0267 0.6664 -0.0192 0.7041
(0.8623) (0.2267) (0.6822) (0.1847) (0.6741) (0.1785) (0.7769) (0.2200)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.7898) (0.4570) (0.8649) (0.4207) (0.7312) (0.5233) (0.8517) (0.4255)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0365* 0.0721 -0.0391* 0.0625 -0.0360* 0.0925 -0.0375* 0.0676
(0.0174) (0.5363) (0.0238) (0.6237) (0.0401) (0.4994) (0.0289) (0.5975)
Banking Crisis 0.0022 0.0058 0.0017 0.0058
(0.2856) (0.8343) (0.4324) (0.8411)
Banking Supervision -0.0026 -0.0402 -0.0026 -0.0400
(0.4055) (0.1314) (0.4125) (0.1269)
Financial Reform Index, 0 to 21 -0.0020* -0.0213*
(0.0425) (0.0175)
Observations 222,099 220,643 214,242 212,989 214,242 212,989 214,242 212,989
Number of id 20,703 20,697 19,929 19,923 19,929 19,923 19,929 19,923
Adjusted R-squared 0.0073 0.0180 0.0074 0.0199 0.0076 0.0203 0.0074 0.0199
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable Banking Crisis is a country-year-specific dummy taking the value of one during the years a given country experiences a banking crisis.
The variable Banking Supervision is a country-year-specific index taking values between 0 and 3 in which higher values indicate more banking regulation. The variable Financial
Reform Index is a country-year-specific index taking values between 0 and 21 in which higher values indicate higher financial liberalization. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank
fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 9: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Market Share in terms of Assets
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0208** -0.1563** -0.0248** -0.1841** -0.0211** -0.1644**
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Market Share 0.0769** 0.5984** 0.0782** 0.5943**
(0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0058) (0.0052)
HHI index on deposit 0.0348 0.0900
(0.0780) (0.5515)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0599* 0.5341**
(0.0441) (0.0010)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.8123) (0.4189)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1220** -0.4926**
(0.0000) (0.0055)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187
Adjusted R-squared 0.0200 0.0138 0.0253 0.0249 0.0526 0.0357
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Market Share YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend NO NO NO NO
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Market Share is an interaction term between the deposit
insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. It is
computed as the average value of the market share on assets over the periods preceding adoption. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a
constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the
explained variance.
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Table 10: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Total Assets over GDP
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0208** -0.1563** -0.0227** -0.1668** -0.0188** -0.1471**
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0396** 0.1849 0.0329** 0.1520
(0.0024) (0.0784) (0.0012) (0.1127)
HHI index on deposit 0.0254 0.0131
(0.2310) (0.9362)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0657* 0.5663**
(0.0306) (0.0004)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.8589) (0.3701)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1215** -0.4813**
(0.0000) (0.0078)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187
Adjusted R-squared 0.0200 0.0138 0.0225 0.0203 0.0476 0.0298
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Assets/GDP YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trends NO NO NO NO
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Assets over GDP is an interaction term between the
deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption.
It is computed as the average value of the ratio of Assets to GDP over the periods preceding adoption. Standard
errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes
a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the
explained variance.
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Table 11: The Eﬀect of the Initial Capital-to-Assets Ratio
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0208** -0.1563** 0.0227** -0.0067 0.0212** -0.0072
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.8622) (0.0045) (0.8545)
DI*ex ante CAR -0.2759** -0.9342** -0.2546** -0.8731**
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0014)
HHI index on deposit 0.0063 -0.0771
(0.7159) (0.5936)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0394 0.4557**
(0.1574) (0.0032)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0000
(0.3846) (0.5052)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0695** -0.2259
(0.0044) (0.1515)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187
Adjusted R-squared 0.0200 0.0138 0.1661 0.0991 0.1736 0.1013
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante CAR YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trends NO NO NO NO
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante CAR is an interaction term between the deposit
insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. It is computed as
the average value of the Capital-to-Assets ratio over the periods preceding adoption. Standard errors clustered at
the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term.
The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 12: The Eﬀect of the Initial Liabilities-to-Equity ratio
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0208** -0.1563** -0.0320** -0.2685** -0.0276** -0.2511**
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity 0.0013** 0.0123** 0.0011** 0.0119**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0234 -0.0086
(0.1735) (0.9446)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0604* 0.4992**
(0.0279) (0.0003)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0000
(0.6799) (0.5570)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1127** -0.3952*
(0.0000) (0.0105)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187
Adjusted R-squared 0.0200 0.0138 0.0486 0.0836 0.0704 0.0897
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Year*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trends NO NO NO NO
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between the deposit
insurance adoption dummy and indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the
average value of the the Liabilities-to-Equity ratio over the periods preceding adoption. Standard errors clustered
at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term.
The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 13: First-Diﬀerence and Bank-speciﬁc Trends
First Difference Bank Specific Trend
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
∆ Deposit Insurance -0.0075** -0.0784** -0.0080** -0.0829** -0.0049 -0.0669* -0.0059* -0.0691**
(0.0048) (0.0012) (0.0045) (0.0004) (0.0617) (0.0120) (0.0301) (0.0055)
∆HHI_d 0.0175 0.0287 0.0155 -0.0106
(0.1123) (0.6757) (0.1213) (0.8602)
∆GDP -0.0510 -0.0947 -0.0542 -0.1842
(0.2915) (0.7140) (0.2756) (0.4925)
∆inflation -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001**
(0.9046) (0.0988) (0.9253) (0.0018)
∆ln_GDPPC -0.0159 0.2544** -0.0146 0.3675**
(0.4188) (0.0097) (0.5750) (0.0031)
Observations 199,844 197,979 199,844 197,979 199,844 197,979 199,844 197,979
Adjusted R-squared 0.0025 0.0088 0.0032 0.0090 0.0042 0.0079 0.0050 0.0082
Regression Type Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD Bank FD
FE NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Number of id 20,703 20,695 20,703 20,695
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The first four columns presents the First-Difference estimator while the next four columns present the random correlated trend model allowing for unit-specific
(here bank) trends. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted
R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 14: Aggregating across Country and Ignoring Time Series Information
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0176** -0.1221** -0.0128* -0.1192**
(0.0052) (0.0002) (0.0130) (0.0004)
Packagvations 10,226 10,021 10,226 10,021
Adjusted R-squared 0.0145 0.0172 0.0079 0.0164
Regression Type OLS OLS OLS OLS
FE NO NO NO NO
Year FE NO NO NO NO
Cluster Country Country Country Country
First-Stage Controls NO NO YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Here I implement the method suggested by Bertrand and Duflo (2004) to deal with serial
correlation. First, I regress the various risk proxies on banks FE, year FE and possibly covariates, excluding the
deposit insurance dummy . Then I divide the residuals of banks treated, i.e. those facing an adoption of deposit
insurance in the period covered, into two groups: residuals from years before the adoptions and residuals from
years after the adoptions. Finally, I regress these residuals on the deposit insurance dummy in a two-peridos panel
frameworks. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model.
All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of
bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Online Appendix [For online publication
only]
Appendix A
Deposit Insurance Scheme: a Brief Presentation
The ﬁrst deposit insurance scheme in the world was the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) in the United States.36 The decision was taken just after the wave of bank
failures experienced during the Great Depression. On June 16, 1933, President Roosevelt
signs the Banking Act (also known as the Glass-Steagal Act) “creating a Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and providing for the insurance of deposits in member banks of the
Federal Reserve System and also in nonmember banks under certain conditions.”.37 The
temporary scheme was fully implemented on January 1, 1934 and the Banking Act of 1935
established the FDIC as a permanent agency of the government. The explicit goal was to
raise the conﬁdence of the Americans in the banking system by alleviating the disruptions
caused by bank failures and bank runs.38
Since then, a large number of countries have adopted an explicit deposit insurance
scheme as part of their regulatory framework.39 Establishment of deposit insurance
schemes has been largely promoted by IMF and World Bank in the 90’s. Similarly, a
deposit insurance scheme is now required to become member of the European Union.
These last years, an international harmonization of these deposit insurance schemes has
been initiated by the International Association of Deposit Insurers and the European Fo-
rum of Deposit Insurers, both founded in 2002. In 2010, 109 countries have an explicit
deposit insurance system.
Protecting small and unsophisticated depositors with deposit insurance has the main
36In Norway there was a guarantee fund for savings banks with voluntary membership as early as 1921
which then became mandatory in 1924, whereas a guarantee fund for commercial banks was first introduced
in 1938. However, Norway’s guarantee fund is not considered a pure deposit insurance scheme so it had
no official explicit deposit insurance until 1961. (? and EFDI 2006 report)
37http://archive.org/details/FullTextTheGlass-steagallActA.k.a.TheBankingActOf1933
38See http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf for further details on the history of
the FDIC
39Countries having an explicit deposit insurance scheme and years of adoption are presented in table 1.
8 TABLES AND FIGURES 51
advantage of ruling out bank runs and panics in case of ﬁnancial stress or lack of conﬁdence
in the banking system. When depositors are uncertain about the liquidity position of their
bank, the best individual strategy is to run withdrawing their funds from bank. However,
this strategy is collectively ineﬃcient because it forces banks to stop proﬁtable projects
and to sell assets at ﬁre-sale prices, which may destabilise the entire banking system
because of contagion (Allen and Gale (2000) and Diamond and Rajan (2005)).40 These
contagion phenomena can lead to a drastic reduction in the amount of loans oﬀered to
the economy for an extended period of time. Deposit insurance is a powerful tool to
remove this uncertainty so that there is no longer room for panics and ineﬃcient bank
runs (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). This is deﬁnitely the main beneﬁt from introducing
an explicit deposit insurance scheme as shown by the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Just after the
Lehman fall, there were large doubts about the health of many banks. But no banks really
faced a bank run by non-institutional depositors, excepting Northern Rock. It is also very
likely that some bank liquidations have been facilitated because depositors didn’t run even
though failure was almost certain.
However, deposit insurance schemes may have signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects. It is often
argued that deposit insurance reinforces moral hazard in banking: existence of deposit in-
surances makes depositors less interested in monitoring bank risk-taking. In other words,
deposit insurance sensibly erodes market discipline as evidenced by Demirguc-Kunt and
Huizinga (2004). Then, shareholders and bank management can keep any excess prof-
its without having to support the cost of excessive risk-taking on deposit rates (Merton
(1977)). This relaxation of market discipline is very likely concerning the bank leverage,
i.e. the bank capital buﬀer. In presence of guarantees, creditors are much less concerned
by the capital cushion of banks. Banks can thus improve the return on equity by increasing
their leverage. Overall, there are strong presumptions that introduction of a deposit insur-
ance scheme may foster bank risk-taking if deposit insurance premia are not adequately
priced.41
40Nonetheless, some work show that bank runs can be seen as a way to introduce some contingency in
demand deposit contract. Accordingly bank runs can be efficient. See Allen and Gale (1998).
41That is exactly what Keeley (1990) explained in the introduction of his famous paper: “It has long been
recognised that a fixed rate deposit insurance system, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
(FDIC’s), or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation’s ( FSLIC’s) can pose a moral hazard
for excessive risk taking. The reason is that banks or thrifts can borrow at or below the risk-free rate by
issuing insured deposits and then investing the proceeds in risky assets with higher expected yields.”
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Accordingly, most of deposit insurance schemes are designed to limit these perverse
incentives. First, there often exists upper bounds on the amount covered (100 000 € in
the euro zone for instance). These limits make possible to discriminate between small,
fragile, and uninformed depositors from large depositors who are supposed to have higher
ability to monitor banks as shown by Ioannidou and Penas (2010). Also, many deposit
insurance schemes incorporate a coinsurance mechanism. In this case, depositors will have
to support a small share of the losses in case of bank failure. Another way to curb the
moral hazard related to deposit insurance can be to implement risk-based premium rather
than flat premium: the more risky the bank strategy, the higher the premium the bank
have to pay. But it requires to very accurately assess the ex ante risk of banks, which
can be diﬃcult (Acharya et al. (2010)). More generally, deposit insurances schemes have
various features that may induce some heterogeneity in the eﬀects of these guarantee funds
on bank risk-taking.42
To summarise, the main beneﬁt associated with deposit insurance is to rule out inef-
ﬁcient and very destructive bank runs. This is why deposit insurance scheme has been
largely promoted across the world by various institutions like the IMF or the World Bank.
However, in providing guarantees on the liabilities of banks, it can fuel bank risk-taking
and make more likely to experience bank failures.
42But collecting time-varying data about these features is a hard task. See Appendix A for further
discussion on this issue
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Appendix B
Deposit Insurance Scheme Database
There already exists two important databases about deposit insurance schemes. The
ﬁrst one is the “Deposit Insurance Around the World data set” constructed by Demirgüç-
Kunt, Karacaovali and Laeven in 2003 (Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005) and then ?). It
lists numerous characteristics about deposit insurance schemes implemented around the
world until 2003. It provides data like the year of introduction, the amount of deposits
covered, the existence of coinsurance and many other features. The second one is the
“Bank Regulation and Supervision Database” constructed by Barth, Caprio and Levine in
2001 (Barth et al. (2001)) and updated in 2008 and 2012.43 It contains roughly the same
kind of information than the previous ones (excepting the year of adoption however).
Unfortunately these two databases do not contain any information about recent, i.e.
post-2003, deposit insurance adoptions. Above all, they sometimes provide diﬀerent and
contradicting information. As a ﬁrst step, I compare these two databases to the data
provided by reports from both the International Association of Deposit Insurers and the
The European Forum of Deposit Insurers to build a unique and homogeneous database
about deposit insurance scheme around the world. Especially, I use the four wave of the
“International Deposit Insurance Survey Questionnaire” (2003, 2008, 2010 and 2011)44
and the “Deposit Guarantee Systems: EFDI’s First Report” (2006).45 I also look at
some reports of the Financial Sector Assessment Program46 from the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund: in many cases, they provide information about the
existence and the year of adoption of deposit insurance scheme. For European countries,
I also confront the sources with a report from the European Commission.47 Regarding
countries from the MENA region, I used a document summarizing the main information
about deposit insurance systems in this region.48 Finally, the consistency of the year of
43However the part concerning deposit insurance scheme doesn’t seem to have been updated.
44http://www.iadi.org/Research.aspx?id=58
45http://www.efdi.net/documents.asp?Id=5&Cat=Efdi%20Publications
46http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/FPS/fsapcountrydb.nsf/
47http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm
48http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMNAREGTOPPOVRED/Resources/MENAFlagshipDeposits2_
25_11.pdf
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adoption has also been inspected using the deposit insurance websites.49
The main task consist in checking the exact year of introduction of deposit insurance
scheme. I also collect additional information about some deposit insurance features like
the existence of coinsurance mechanism (yes/no), the nature of the premia collected (ﬂat
or risk-based), or the timing of the funding (ex ante, ex post, or both). However, there are
important diﬃculties to get consistent, reliable and time-varying information about these
features. In particular the various sources used do not indicate the year of implementation
of these features. For instance, imagine a country that adopted a deposit insurance scheme
in 1995. In the 2008 IADI survey, it is not possible to know whether this country have
coinsurance mechanism since 1995 or whether such a feature have been implemented latter.
Hence, these information can only be exploited cross-sectionally. Using these information
in a time-varying framework would be at cost of strong assumptions.
In general, the previous sources provide a year of adoption corresponding to the date
at which the parliament votes the law establishing the deposit insurance fund. It is very
likely to observe some delay before the deposit insurance scheme becomes eﬀective. When
available, I take advantage from the month of adoption: when the date provides a month
after July, I change the year of adoption by the year immediately following. At the end, I
obtain a database describing the year of adoption and some features of deposit insurance
schemes in 197 countries as shown in table 3.
Compared to the database of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005), I collect the year of adoption
for 24 additional countries. For 34 countries, the date of adoption diﬀers from the one
of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005). For 19 of these 34 countries, the diﬀerence is related to
the delay between enactment by the parliament and eﬀective implementation as explained
before. In these cases, the date of implementation is just one year after the one previously
established. It remains 13 countries for which dates of adoption diﬀer by more than one
year (Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia-herzegovina, Bulgaria, Guatemala, Honduras,
Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, Portugal, Spain, and Ukraine). However, in most of the
cases, these diﬀerences are related to longer delay between enactment and implementation.
49http://www.cdic.ca/CDIC/Cooperation/IntlLinks/Pages/default.aspx or http://www.iadi.org/
aboutIADI.aspx?id=48
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Treatment of date
Most of the ﬁnancial companies publish their account statements at the end of the year,
namely in December. Nonetheless, sometimes banks use non-calendar ﬁscal years to report
their balance sheet statement (in March for several big Japanese banks, in October for
several big Canadian banks...). On the top of that, even though BankScope provides us
only with annual data, for a few hundred observations you have duplicated observations
for balance sheet statements that closed at several dates within a single year. So one needs
to handle both the allocation issue over year t or t − 1 as well as the duplicated issue of
yearly ﬁnancial statements published several times a year.
These diﬀerences raise an important issue. It is likely that one prefer to compare
data of ﬁnancial statements reported in March of year t with data of ﬁnancial statements
reported in December of year t− 1 rather than with data of ﬁnancial statements reported
in December of year t. The help ﬁle from Duprey and Lé (2014) proposes a small program
that handles the situation in a compact way. Here I summarize their method.
• First, I identify banks which have "natural" duplicates, i.e. banks with the same id
having at least two observations within the same ﬁscal year. Essentially I remove an
observation of the 30th November 2012 if I have an observation for the 31th December
2012. Precisely, I always keep the observation with:
– the month closest to December and if necessary,
– the day closest to the last day of the month.
• Then, if I have banks which report their ﬁnancial account in March 2012, it makes
more sense to consider it as end of 2011 data. So for each observations with a
reporting month before June, I replace the actual year, saying t, by the previous
year, saying t − 1.
• Last, note that the previous step is likely to create new duplicates. So once again, the
best strategy would be to keep the observation that have the least forward looking
information. Consequently, between two observations reporting the same year after
the previous change, I keep the one with the variable year unchanged. For instance
assume that I have two observations reported in 2011 after the previous step. Then
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I drop the observation reporting 2011 as year, with March as month (and so 2012
as “true” year), provided I have already an observation reporting 2011 as year, with
September as month (and so 2011 as “true” year).
For more details, see Duprey and Lé (2014).
Restrictions imposed on the balance sheet data
First, I only work with Commercial Banks, Savings Banks, Cooperative Banks, Real Estate
& Mortgage Bank, Islamic Banks and Other Non Banking Credit Institution: these are
the ﬁnancial institutions which are concerned by such an insurance scheme.50 Second,
BankScope indicates whether the data come from consolidated (coded as C1 and C2 ) or
unconsolidated accounts (coded as U1 and U2 ). When a bank reports both consolidated
and unconsolidated accounts in the sample, I keep only the unconsolidated entries to avoid
double counting. The rationale for this choice is based on the observation that deposit
insurance is generally provided by the host country to the subsidiaries operating in this
country.
Furthermore, I exclude from the sample: banks that report less than ﬁve observations,
and countries with less than ﬁfty observations. Last, I also deal with the presence of
several observations for a speciﬁc bank during a given ﬁscal year and the fact that some
observations are reported during the ﬁscal year and not at the end of the ﬁscal year.
The exact procedure implemented is described in the previous paragraph and additional
information about BankScope can be found in Duprey and Lé (2014).
50The literature generally uses only the three first types of banks, but after looking in detail at the list
of banks participating to the deposit insurance scheme in some countries, I note that the three last types
of bank are very often members of the deposit insurance funds.
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Appendix C
In this appendix, I present the additional robustness checks that have not been include in
the paper for the sake of brevity.
Treated sample
As explain in the section concerning the data, I choose to perform the estimations on the
largest sample, mainly to have a smooth and stable control group over time. This sample
includes countries for which we do not observe implementation of deposit insurance scheme
during the period covered.51 It can be countries that adopted a deposit insurance scheme
before the ﬁrst year of the period studied (1986), or countries that do not have a deposit
insurance system yet. When using this extended sample, the control group on which
the identiﬁcation relies includes these countries. A classical robustness check consists in
replicating the regressions using a diﬀerent control group (Roberts and Whited (2011)).
In particular, ﬁnding diﬀerent results would cast doubt on the fundamental common trend
assumption. I thereby restrict the sample by excluding countries with no policy change.
The results are shown in table 19.
For both the leverage ratio and the distance-to-default, the coeﬃcient associated with
the deposit insurance adoption dummy remains highly signiﬁcant. The magnitude of the
coeﬃcients are only slightly lower than those from the baseline regressions. Hence, the
main result established previously appears robust to the use of alternative control group.
Various log of z-score’s
When using the z-score in a time-varying framework, there is an issue to consider carefully:
the way to compute the mean and the standard deviation of ROAAt. There is no clear
consensus about this issue. Lepetit and Strobel (2011) compares the various time-varying
z-score used in the literature. They conclude that while appealing, the use of time-varying
standard deviation of ROAAt is not the best way to compute the z-score. They also suggest
to use the mean of ROAAt computed over the full period of analysis. However, they remark
that contemporaneous value of ROAAt provides almost the same results. Here I use the
51See table 1
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contemporaneous value of ROAAt and a standard deviation of ROAAt computed over the
full sample.
To conﬁrm that the results are not aﬀected by the way I choose to construct the z-
score, I provide results using alternative z-score. In table 20, I present results for the
log of z-score in which the Capital-to-Assets Ratio and the Return on Average Asset are
computed using a moving average with two lags and two leads. I also report results for
regression using a log of z-score in which the standard deviation of the Return on Average
Asset is computed as the absolute deviation from the average returns (Nicolò et al. (2007)
and Lepetit and Strobel (2011)):
σ(ROAAi,t) =| ROAAi,t −
∑
t
ROAAi,t
T
|
In addition, to conﬁrm that the main conclusions are not related to the log transfor-
mation, I re-run various regressions implemented in this paper using the z-score itself. The
results can be found in table 21.
The z-score replication conﬁrms entirely the previously established results. However
note that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient is largely reduced when including country-
speciﬁc trends. Concerning the coeﬃcients from the regressions using alternative log of
z-score, they are all highly signiﬁcant and their magnitude is virtually similar. The main
conclusions supported by this paper are thus independent from the way the z-score is
computed.
Different samples
To make sure that the results established previously are not driven by some unobserved
features of the main sample, I also run regressions using three distinct sub-samples.52
First, a sub-sample restricted to the publicly listed banks is derived from the original
sample. Generally, listed banks provide more reliable balance-sheet data. They also form a
relatively more homogeneous group of banks across countries what should improve quality
of estimations. Finally, we could also conjecture that these banks are more easily monitored
and hence the market discipline is likely to be more eﬀective on these banks. But focusing
on these banks sensibly reduces the number of observations.
52For all these distinct samples the same restrictions as before are applied.
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The second sub-sample addresses the issue of failed banks. A lot of papers has em-
phasized that BankScope may be subject to a survivorship bias, namely the fact that the
Bureau van Dijk deletes historical information on banks that no longer exist in the lat-
est release of this database (Gropp and Heider (2010)). However, the BankScope version
used in this paper seems to be free from this survivorship bias.53 While many researchers
desire to be sure that their results are not aﬀected by this survivorship bias, I face here
the opposite issue: I want to make sure that the increase in risk-taking that I capture
is not driven by some very risky banks that eventually went bankrupt. To address this
issue, I restrict the sample to active banks in 2007, i.e. banks reporting information in
2007.54 Consequently, all the banks that went bankrupt before this date are not include in
the sample. The third sub-sample just considers the possibility that the results could be
strongly driven by the end of the sample including the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Hence,
I drop the years after 2007.
The results are shown in tables 22 and 23. The adverse eﬀect of introducing a deposit
insurance system is largely conﬁrmed when using these three samples. The increase in risk-
taking after adopting a depositors protection fund remains statistically and economically
signiﬁcant in all the sub-samples. The magnitude of the eﬀect of deposit insurance is
roughly unchanged.
Finally, note that I also replicate the baseline regression after having dropped each
countries from the main sample one after one. This aims to conﬁrm that the results
are not driven by a single country. In these 123 regressions, the main ﬁnding is always
conﬁrmed.55
Mergers and Acquisitions
Studies of banking industry must deal with an important issue: the mergers and acqui-
sitions. Mergers and acquisitions may induce large artiﬁcial changes in balance sheets
provided by BankScope. Especially, large variations in the Capital-to-Assets ratio may be
53For instance, AmTrade International Bank of Georgia failed in 2002 and the
FDIC was unable to arrange a transfer of its deposits to another financial institution
(http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/amtrade.html). However, the balance sheets (up to
2002) of this bank are reported in BankScope and appears in the main sample.
54I choose the year 2007 to avoid the 2007-2009 financial crisis
55Results available upon request
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observed after M&A. As regards the question studied in this paper, M&A may bias the
previous results if these changes in the Capital-to-Assets ratio due to M&A are correlated
in some way with deposit insurance adoption. For instance, deposit insurance adoption
maight induce a restructuring process in the banking sector favoring M&A. I tackle this
issue by removing from the sample banks having a growth of assets higher than 50%.
These results are shown in table 24. It appears that controlling explicitly for a potential
bias due to M&A leaves the main ﬁndings totally unchanged.
Additional control variables
Finally, I replicate the baseline regressions (with and without linear or quadratic country-
speciﬁc trends) and I include additional control variables at the bank-level. As explained
before, including these variables may induce strong endogeneity issue, notably because
these variables are likely to be aﬀected by deposit insurance adoption. Even after including
the bank-speciﬁc covariates, the risk-shifting eﬀect of deposit insurance adoption continues
to be captured, as it can be seen in table 25.
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Tables and Figures
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0
2
4
6
8
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
CAR
Before DI Adoption
After DI Adoption
Distribution of Risk (Capital−to−Assets ratio)
 for Banks Facing Deposit Insurance Adoption
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
D
en
si
ty
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
ln_z_score2
Before DI Adoption
After DI Adoption
Distribution of Risk (ln(z−score))
 for Banks Facing Deposit Insurance Adoption
Note: These figures show the kernel density of the Capital-to-Assets ratio (top) and the log of z-score
(bottom) before (in blue) and after (in white) deposit insurance adoption. The sample of banks is restricted
to banks for which we have observations before and after deposit insurance adoption. A lower value signals
an increase in the leverage (top)/ probability of default (bottom).
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Figure 7 & 8
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Note: These figures show the distribution of the average Capital-to-Assets ratio (top) and log of z-score
(bottom) before (in blue) and after (in white) deposit insurance adoption. The sample of banks is restricted
to banks for which we have observations before and after deposit insurance adoption. There is only one
observation per banks and per period (before/after). A lower value signals an increase in the leverage (top)
or in the probability of default (bottom).
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Figure 9 & 10
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Note: These figures show the distribution of the difference between the average Capital-to-Assets ratio
(top) and log of z-score (bottom) computed after and before deposit insurance adoption. The sample of
banks is restricted to banks for which we have observations before and after deposit insurance adoption.
A negative value indicates that the average Capital-to-Assets ratio (top)/log of z-score (bottom) is lower
after adoption.
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Figure 11 & 12
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Note: These figures show the dynamics of the impact of deposit insurance adoption on the Capital-to-
Assets ratio (top) and the log of z-score (bottom).The solid blue line represents the point estimate while
the dashed red lines display 95% confidence intervals. The underlying regression used a set of dummy
variables for each year before and after deposit insurance adoption. The two very last dummy variables
take the value of 1 for all the periods more than 6 years before adoption and for all the periods more than
7 year after the adoption. The reference year is the year preceding adoption (year -1).
8
T
A
B
L
E
S
A
N
D
F
IG
U
R
E
S
65
Table 15: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Market Share in terms of Assets. Robustness Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0151** -0.1048** -0.0143** -0.1021** -0.0144** -0.1014** -0.0145** -0.1006**
(0.0027) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0061) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Market Share 0.0466 0.3470 0.0454 0.3395 0.0455 0.3341 0.0314 0.2064
(0.0647) (0.0892) (0.0731) (0.0935) (0.0743) (0.1036) (0.1805) (0.2246)
HHI index on deposit 0.0108 0.0607 0.0102 0.0669 0.0057 -0.0062
(0.5987) (0.5632) (0.6062) (0.5143) (0.8075) (0.9609)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0663** 0.3162* 0.0695* 0.2700 0.0663** 0.2548
(0.0067) (0.0213) (0.0179) (0.0888) (0.0084) (0.0930)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.7997) (0.2265) (0.8009) (0.2294) (0.7179) (0.1375)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1339** -0.3984 -0.1316** -0.4360* -0.1567** -0.5236*
(0.0004) (0.0727) (0.0002) (0.0448) (0.0000) (0.0248)
BC*ex ante Market Share -0.0036 -0.1940
(0.9192) (0.4854)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0020 -0.0203
(0.7290) (0.5129)
BS*ex ante Market Share 0.0482 0.3337
(0.0660) (0.0818)
Banking Supervision (BS) -0.0100* -0.0584
(0.0431) (0.0511)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 10,285 10,088
R-squared 0.1213 0.1263 0.1280 0.1283 0.1280 0.1287 0.1128 0.1151
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,014 1,013
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year*ex ante Market Share YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Market Share is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the
systemic importance of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the market share on assets over the periods preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex ante
Market Share is an interaction term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex
ante Market Share is an interaction term between the Banking Supervision index and the indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account
the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 16: The Eﬀect of Systemic Importance: ex ante Assets over GDP. Robustness Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0147** -0.1020** -0.0138** -0.0988** -0.0139** -0.0973** -0.0146** -0.1077**
(0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0026) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0301** 0.1871 0.0275** 0.1771 0.0273** 0.1687 0.0271* 0.2368
(0.0019) (0.0956) (0.0032) (0.1159) (0.0030) (0.1421) (0.0110) (0.0591)
HHI index on deposit 0.0044 0.0183 0.0035 0.0204 -0.0002 -0.0445
(0.8312) (0.8680) (0.8677) (0.8501) (0.9925) (0.7286)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0689** 0.3234* 0.0720* 0.2757 0.0698** 0.2467
(0.0063) (0.0166) (0.0136) (0.0638) (0.0073) (0.1000)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.7977) (0.2305) (0.8078) (0.2471) (0.7687) (0.1466)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1364** -0.4074 -0.1345** -0.4508* -0.1581** -0.5217*
(0.0003) (0.0654) (0.0002) (0.0402) (0.0000) (0.0222)
BC*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0180 0.3017
(0.5754) (0.3813)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0011 -0.0400
(0.8222) (0.1868)
BS*ex ante Assets/GDP 0.0549** 0.4321*
(0.0004) (0.0145)
Banking Supervision (BS) -0.0087* -0.0540
(0.0471) (0.0533)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 10,285 10,088
R-squared 0.1165 0.1200 0.1233 0.1219 0.1234 0.1224 0.1104 0.1120
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,014 1,013
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year*ex ante Assets/GDP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Assets over GDP is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the
systemic importance of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the ratio of Assets to GDP over the periods preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex ante
Assets over GDP is an interaction term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex
ante Assets over GDP is an interaction term between the Banking Supervision index and the indicator reflecting the systemic importance of each bank before adoption. Standard
errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into
account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 17: The Eﬀect of the Initial Capital-to-Assets Ratio. Robustness Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance 0.0272** 0.0390 0.0260** 0.0370 0.0261** 0.0403 0.0277** 0.0406
(0.0021) (0.2961) (0.0070) (0.3382) (0.0075) (0.2962) (0.0035) (0.3087)
DI*ex ante CAR -0.2667** -0.8822** -0.2536** -0.8490** -0.2544** -0.8685** -0.2874** -0.9765**
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001)
HHI index on deposit -0.0029 -0.0161 -0.0035 -0.0097 -0.0101 -0.0856
(0.8835) (0.8891) (0.8574) (0.9293) (0.6885) (0.5377)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0585* 0.3032* 0.0606* 0.2466 0.0619* 0.2489
(0.0260) (0.0326) (0.0440) (0.1285) (0.0445) (0.1286)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.7066) (0.1510) (0.7078) (0.1564) (0.6576) (0.0908)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0958** -0.2327 -0.0937** -0.2627 -0.1038** -0.3074
(0.0089) (0.2833) (0.0065) (0.2235) (0.0058) (0.1813)
BC*ex ante CAR 0.0052 0.1820
(0.9263) (0.4173)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0006 -0.0592
(0.9323) (0.2585)
BS*ex ante CAR -0.1595 -0.5923*
(0.0590) (0.0214)
Banking Supervision (BS) 0.0154 0.0455
(0.1265) (0.2954)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 10,285 10,088
R-squared 0.2283 0.1724 0.2316 0.1735 0.2316 0.1739 0.2281 0.1623
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,014 1,013
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year*ex ante CAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante CAR is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting the leverage of
each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the Capital-to-Assets ratio over the periods preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex ante CAR is an interaction
term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex ante CAR is an interaction term between the
Banking Supervision index and the indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way
Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 18: The Eﬀect of the Initial Liabilities-to-Equity ratio. Robustness Checks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0249** -0.2139** -0.0235** -0.2099** -0.0235** -0.2081** -0.0248** -0.2175**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity 0.0012** 0.0126** 0.0012** 0.0125** 0.0012** 0.0124** 0.0012** 0.0125**
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit -0.0030 -0.0660 -0.0034 -0.0529 -0.0105 -0.1359
(0.8812) (0.5427) (0.8635) (0.6154) (0.6524) (0.3011)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0667** 0.2972* 0.0689* 0.2392 0.0683* 0.2239
(0.0087) (0.0341) (0.0196) (0.1316) (0.0122) (0.1640)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.8637) (0.2167) (0.8641) (0.2238) (0.8055) (0.1393)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1221** -0.2742 -0.1203** -0.3161 -0.1440** -0.3857
(0.0008) (0.1788) (0.0005) (0.1145) (0.0001) (0.0737)
BC*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity -0.0000 -0.0005
(0.9447) (0.6523)
Banking Crisis (BC) 0.0014 -0.0299
(0.7819) (0.3555)
BS*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity 0.0001 0.0019
(0.5112) (0.4026)
Banking Supervision (BS) -0.0083 -0.0551
(0.0580) (0.1586)
Observations 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 12,299 12,064 10,285 10,088
R-squared 0.1352 0.1610 0.1406 0.1621 0.1406 0.1625 0.1262 0.1454
Number of id 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,188 1,187 1,014 1,013
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year*ex ante leverage Terms YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Ctry Specific Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the variable DI*ex ante Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between the deposit insurance adoption dummy and an indicator reflecting
the leverage of each bank before adoption. It is computed as the average value of the the Liabilities-to-Equity ratio over the periods preceding adoption. The variable BC*ex
ante Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between the Banking Crisis dummy and the indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. The variable BS*ex ante
Liab.-to-Equity is an interaction term between the Banking Supervision index and the indicator reflecting the leverage of each bank before adoption. Standard errors clustered at the
country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution
of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 19: Sample of Treated Countries
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0199** -0.1443** -0.0142** -0.1204**
(0.0065) (0.0002) (0.0081) (0.0004)
HHI index on deposit 0.0220 0.0413
(0.3319) (0.8022)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0082 0.4746*
(0.7984) (0.0451)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.8599) (0.3494)
Log of GDP per capita -0.1144** -0.3916**
(0.0000) (0.0026)
Observations 29,560 29,162 29,560 29,162
Number of id 3,197 3,195 3,197 3,195
Adjusted R-squared 0.0111 0.0096 0.0248 0.0147
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In this table, the sample excludes all countries with no change in the Deposit Insurance
dummy, i.e. those having already adopted a Deposit Insurance scheme before the first year of the sample and those
without Deposit Insurance Scheme at the end of the sample. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value
in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared
does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 20: Various log of z-score
CAR Contemporaneous Contemporaneous Mov. Av. (2 1 2) Contemporaneous Contemporaneous
ROOA Contemporaneous Mov. Av. (2 1 2) Mov. Av. (2 1 2) Sample Av. Contemporaneous
Stand. dev. ROAA Sample Av. Sample Av. Sample Av. Sample Av. Instantaneous
Deposit Insurance -0.1687*** -0.1578*** -0.1325*** -0.1490*** -0.0745**
(0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0351)
HHI index on deposit -0.0971* -0.0619 -0.0499 -0.0908* -0.4822***
(0.0569) (0.0545) (0.0468) (0.0499) (0.1081)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.5505*** 0.4517*** 0.6945*** 0.1808** 1.4350***
(0.0840) (0.0792) (0.0684) (0.0706) (0.2015)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Log of GDP per capita 0.0666 0.0495 0.0435 -0.0679* 0.6258***
(0.0467) (0.0456) (0.0425) (0.0398) (0.0839)
Observations 220,643 221,491 221,803 221,839 220,645
Number of id 20,697 20,697 20,697 20,696 20,699
Adjusted R-squared 0.0180 0.0169 0.0242 0.0146 0.0091
Bank FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In all the column the dependent variable is the logarithm of z-score. The lines CAR, ROAA and Stand. dev. ROAA indicates how each of the z-score component
is computed. Mov Av. (2 1 2) means Moving Average with a window centered around the contemporaneous value and including two lags and two leads. Sample Av. means average
computed for each bank over the entire sample. Instantaneous ROAA reefers to the difference between contemporaneous value of ROAA and the bank sample average of ROAA.
Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take
into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 21: z-score regressions
z-score
Deposit Insurance -4.4844** -3.8283** -1.4252 -1.3858* -1.2565* -1.2519*
(0.0026) (0.0009) (0.0667) (0.0478) (0.0266) (0.0201)
HHI index on deposit -0.0828 4.6506 1.8639
(0.9720) (0.0664) (0.3898)
GDP growth (annual %) 21.4703 -5.0983 -4.6675
(0.2606) (0.4461) (0.5057)
Inflation (annual %) 0.0009 -0.0006 0.0001
(0.4748) (0.5891) (0.9121)
Log of GDP per capita -5.8492 3.7134 -4.0979
(0.0714) (0.3348) (0.1387)
Observations 221,654 221,654 221,654 221,654 221,654 221,654
Number of id 20,698 20,698 20,698 20,698 20,698 20,698
Adjusted R-squared 0.0190 0.0203 0.0625 0.0627 0.0675 0.0676
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trends Linear Linear Lin. & Quad. Lin. & Quad.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. In all the regression the dependent variable is the z-score. Standard errors clustered at the
country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The
Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 22: Sample of Listed Banks
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0168 -0.1249* -0.0178* -0.1557* -0.0190** -0.0797 -0.0183** -0.0876
(0.0550) (0.0439) (0.0186) (0.0105) (0.0043) (0.0776) (0.0022) (0.0823)
HHI index on deposit 0.0041 -0.3123 0.0199 -0.1192
(0.9063) (0.1968) (0.4947) (0.5528)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0479 1.0656** -0.0353 0.3765
(0.1053) (0.0001) (0.2792) (0.2390)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0001** -0.0005**
(0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Log of GDP per capita 0.0065 0.1491 0.0121 0.6787**
(0.8432) (0.4595) (0.7213) (0.0022)
Observations 13,240 13,096 13,240 13,096 13,240 13,096 13,240 13,096
Number of id 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253
Adjusted R-squared 0.0172 0.0193 0.0204 0.0305 0.1279 0.1121 0.1319 0.1210
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trends Linear Linear Linear Linear
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. This table presents results from regressions on the sample of banks publicly listed. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses.
Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained
variance.
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Table 23: Sample of Banks Active in 2007 and Sample Excluding Years Post-2007
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0246* -0.0192* -0.1378** -0.1685** -0.0249** -0.0173** -0.1752** -0.1478**
(0.0134) (0.0207) (0.0094) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000)
HHI index on deposit 0.0294 -0.0143 0.0134 -0.0948
(0.2857) (0.9364) (0.2867) (0.2449)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0470 0.4798 0.0455 0.6113*
(0.5129) (0.3584) (0.0644) (0.0136)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.9425) (0.8410) (0.3903)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0267 0.1664 -0.1024** -0.3994**
(0.0966) (0.1672) (0.0000) (0.0058)
Observations 178,949 178,949 178,046 178,046 165,687 165,687 164,760 164,760
Number of id 15,515 15,515 15,514 15,514 20,703 20,703 20,692 20,692
Adjusted R-squared 0.0058 0.0074 0.0200 0.0215 0.0048 0.0113 0.0129 0.0155
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The columns 1 to 4 present the results from regressions on the sample of banks that have an observation in 2007. It thus excludes all the banks that went
bankrupt before 2007. The columns 5 to 8 present the results from regressions on the sample excluding years after 2007. Standard errors clustered at the country level. p-value in
parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the
explained variance.
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Table 24: Controlling for M&A
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0209** -0.1503** -0.0168* -0.1621**
(0.0065) (0.0006) (0.0111) (0.0002)
HHI index on deposit 0.0093 -0.1388
(0.5128) (0.1717)
GDP growth (annual %) -0.0220 0.5666
(0.6883) (0.1801)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001
(0.7629) (0.3730)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0367* 0.0784
(0.0121) (0.4985)
Observations 219,217 217,803 219,217 217,803
Number of id 20,402 20,396 20,402 20,396
Adjusted R-squared 0.0053 0.0172 0.0070 0.0186
Regression Type FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. This table presents the results from regressions on the sample excluding bank observations
having a growth of assets higher than 50% from one year to another. Standard errors clustered at the country
level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a constant term. The Adjusted
R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the explained variance.
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Table 25: Speciﬁcation with bank-speciﬁc covariates
CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score) CAR ln(z-score)
Deposit Insurance -0.0198** -0.1782** -0.0188** -0.1292** -0.0164** -0.1266**
(0.0018) (0.0000) (0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0060) (0.0000)
Cost To Income Ratio 0.0359** 0.0271 0.0364** 0.0324 0.0365** 0.0334
(0.0001) (0.6415) (0.0000) (0.5594) (0.0000) (0.5432)
Net Interest Margin 0.0000** 0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0001**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Total deposits/liabilities -0.0278 0.0051 -0.0358* -0.0684 -0.0342* -0.0478
(0.0685) (0.9245) (0.0143) (0.1573) (0.0204) (0.3262)
Liquid asset/asset 0.0441 0.1144 0.0414 0.0756 0.0419 0.0731
(0.0837) (0.2521) (0.1379) (0.5082) (0.1380) (0.5305)
HHI index on deposit 0.0139 -0.0725 0.0254 0.0947 0.0208 0.0622
(0.4120) (0.4971) (0.1708) (0.3741) (0.2671) (0.5338)
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0040 0.5947 -0.0523 -0.0479 -0.0341 -0.0224
(0.9344) (0.1575) (0.2403) (0.8777) (0.4415) (0.9391)
Inflation (annual %) -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.9628) (0.5109) (0.8121) (0.7955) (0.7126) (0.1936)
Log of GDP per capita -0.0295 0.0859 -0.0230 0.2903 -0.0689 -0.0514
(0.1048) (0.5144) (0.4911) (0.1362) (0.0670) (0.7761)
Observations 219,986 219,115 219,986 219,115 219,986 219,115
Number of id 20,679 20,675 20,679 20,675 20,679 20,675
Adjusted R-squared 0.0848 0.0239 0.1014 0.0558 0.1074 0.0652
Regression Type FE FE FE FE FE FE
FE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
Ctry Specific Trends Linear Linear Lin. & Quad. Lin. & Quad.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05. These regressions include bank-specific covariates taken from BankScope. Standard errors
clustered at the country level. p-value in parentheses. Two-way Fixed-effects model. All regressions includes a
constant term. The Adjusted R-squared does not take into account the contribution of bank fixed effects to the
explained variance.
